Bikers Of America, Know Your Rights!: The CalGang Criminal Intelligence System

OFF THE WIRE

The CalGang Criminal

Intelligence System

As the Result of Its Weak Oversight Structure,

It Contains Questionable Information That May

Violate Individuals’ Privacy Rights

Report 2015-130

Doug Cordiner

Chief Deputy

Elaine M. Howle

State Auditor

621 Capitol Mall, Suite 1200 Sacramento, CA 95814 916.445.0255 916.327.0019 fax www.auditor.ca.gov

August 11, 2016

2015-130

The Governor of California

President pro Tempore of the Senate

Speaker of the Assembly

State Capitol

Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:

As requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the California State Auditor presents this audit report

concerning the CalGang database and how law enforcement has implemented requirements for adding juveniles

to CalGang.

This report concludes that CalGang’s current oversight structure does not ensure that law enforcement

agencies (user agencies) collect and maintain criminal intelligence in a manner that preserves individuals’

privacy rights. Although the California Department of Justice funds it, CalGang is not established in state

statute and consequently receives no state oversight. Instead, the CalGang Executive Board and the California

Gang Node Advisory Committee (CalGang’s governance) oversee CalGang and function independently from

the State and without transparency or meaningful opportunities for public input.

Inadequate oversight contributed to the numerous instances in which the four user agencies we examined

could not substantiate the validity of CalGang entries. Specifically, the agencies lacked adequate support for

13 of 100 people we reviewed in CalGang and for 131 of 563 (23 percent) of the CalGang criteria entries we

reviewed. Although a person’s CalGang record must be purged after five years unless updated with subsequent

criteria, we found more than 600 people in CalGang whose purge dates extended beyond the five-year limit,

many of which were more than 100 years in the future. Finally, the user agencies have poorly implemented a

2014 state law requiring notifications before adding a juvenile to CalGang. Two agencies we reviewed did not

provide juveniles and parents with enough information to reasonably contest the juveniles’ gang designations,

thereby denying many people their right to contest a juvenile’s gang designation.

Although it asserts compliance with federal regulations and state guidelines—standards designed to protect

privacy and other constitutional rights—little evidence exists that CalGang’s governance has ensured these

standards are met. As a result, user agencies are tracking some people in CalGang without adequate justification,

potentially violating their privacy rights. Further, by not reviewing information as required, CalGang’s

governance and user agencies have diminished the system’s crime-fighting value. Although CalGang is not to

be used for expert opinion or employment screenings, we found at least four appellate cases referencing expert

opinions based on CalGang and three agencies we surveyed confirmed they use CalGang for employment

screenings. Although these practices do not appear to be common place, they emphasize the effect CalGang

can have on a person’s life.

We believe that CalGang needs an oversight structure that ensures that information is reliable and that users

adhere to requirements that protect individuals’ rights. Thus, we recommend that the Legislature adopt state

law assigning Justice the responsibility for CalGang oversight and specifying that CalGang must operate under

defined requirements, such as supervisory and periodic record reviews.

Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE, CPA

State Auditor

Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Contents

Summary

Introduction

Audit Results

Due to an Inadequate Leadership Structure, CalGang Has Failed

to Comply With Requirements Designed to Protect Individuals’

Rights to Privacy

Law Enforcement Agencies Could Not Always Demonstrate That

They Had Established Reasonable Suspicion That Groups Were

Gangs Before Entering Them Into CalGang

Law Enforcement Agencies Do Not Have Adequate Support for

Some of the Individuals and Many of the Criteria They Entered

Into CalGang

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Appropriate Safeguards to

Ensure the Accuracy and Security of CalGang Records

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Failed to Appropriately Notify

Necessary Parties Before Entering Juveniles Into CalGang

Governmental Oversight and Increased Public Participation

Could Strengthen CalGang’s Usefulness and Better Ensure It

Protects Individuals’ Rights

Recommendations 55

Appendix A

Summary of Selected CalGang Survey Responses

Appendix B

Demographics of Individuals in CalGang by Location, Type,

Gender, Age, and Race

Response to the Audit

California Department of Justice

Los Angeles Police Department

California State Auditor’s Comments on the Response

From the Los Angeles Police Department

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Santa Ana Police Department

Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office

California State Auditor’s Comments on the Response

From the Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office

Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office

California State Auditor’s Comments on the Response

From the Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office

103

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August 2016

Audit Highlights . . .

Our audit concerning the CalGang database

and how law enforcement agencies (user

agencies) have implemented requirements

for adding juveniles to CalGang revealed

the following:

CalGang’s current oversight structure

does not ensure that user agencies collect

and maintain criminal intelligence in a

manner that does not invade individuals’

privacy rights.

The CalGang Executive Board and the

California Gang Node Advisory

Committee act without statutory

authority, transparency, or meaningful

opportunities for public engagement.

The four user agencies we examined could

not substantiate numerous CalGang

entries they had made, demonstrating

weaknesses in the processes for entering,

evaluating, and auditing the data

in CalGang.

•

Three user agencies were unable to

adequately support that many of the

groups they entered into CalGang met

the criteria for inclusion.

•

All four user agencies lacked support

for CalGang entry criteria suggesting

they inappropriately included in

CalGang 13 of the 100 individuals

we reviewed.

•

More than 600 individuals in CalGang

had purge dates extending beyond the

five-year limit, many of which were

not scheduled to be purged for more

than 100 years.

continued on next page . . .

Summary

Results in Brief

CalGang is a shared criminal intelligence system that law

enforcement agencies (user agencies) throughout the State use

voluntarily. User agencies enter information into CalGang on

suspected gang members, including their names, associated

gangs, and the information that led law enforcement officers

to suspect they were gang members. User agencies have noted

that CalGang’s benefits include directing them to information

about gang members’ interactions with law enforcement officers

throughout the State and facilitating cross‑agency collaboration

when investigating and prosecuting gang‑related crimes. However,

CalGang’s weak leadership structure has been ineffective at

ensuring that the information the user agencies enter is accurate

and appropriate, thus lessening CalGang’s effectiveness as a tool

for fighting gang‑related crimes. Further, the inaccurate data

within CalGang may violate the privacy rights of individuals whose

information appears in CalGang records but who do not actually

meet the criteria for inclusion in the system.

Both the United States Constitution and the California

Constitution recognize the right to privacy—the former implicitly

and the latter explicitly. However, CalGang’s current oversight

structure does not ensure that user agencies collect and maintain

criminal intelligence in a manner that preserves individuals’

privacy rights. Specifically, although the California Department of

Justice (Justice) funds a contract to maintain CalGang, the system

is not established in state statute and consequently receives no

state oversight. Instead, CalGang’s user agencies elect their peers

to serve as members of two entities—the CalGang Executive Board

(board) and its technical subcommittee called the California

Gang Node Advisory Committee (committee)—that oversee

CalGang. These oversight entities function independently from

the State and without transparency or meaningful opportunities

for public engagement. When the committee and the board

established CalGang’s policies and procedures (CalGang policy),

they asserted CalGang’s voluntary compliance with two different

standards: the criminal intelligence requirements in Title 28, Code

of Federal Regulations, Part 23 (federal regulations) and Justice’s

Model Standards and Procedures for Maintaining Criminal

Intelligence Files and Criminal Intelligence Operational Activities

November 2007 (state guidelines)—which were promulgated

to protect privacy and other constitutional rights. However, in

practice, we found little evidence that the committee and the board

have ensured that user agencies comply with either the federal

regulations or the state guidelines.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

A lack of adequate oversight likely contributed to the numerous

instances we found in which the four user agencies we examined—

the Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles), the Santa Ana

Police Department (Santa Ana), the Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s

Office (Santa Clara), and the Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office

(Sonoma)—could not substantiate CalGang entries they had made.

Specifically, Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Sonoma, which add

gangs to the system, were able to demonstrate that only one of the

nine gangs we reviewed met the requirements of CalGang policy

before entry; Santa Clara does not add gangs to the system. We

also found that all four user agencies lacked adequate support for

including 13 of the 100 individuals we reviewed in CalGang. Further,

we reviewed more than 560 criteria related to these 100 individuals

and determined that the user agencies lacked adequate support

for 131, or 23 percent.

Our review uncovered numerous examples demonstrating

weaknesses in the user agencies’ approaches for entering

information into CalGang. For example, Sonoma included a person

in CalGang for allegedly admitting during his booking into county

jail that he was a gang member and for being “arrested for an

offense consistent with gang activity.” However, the supporting files

revealed that this person stated during his booking interview that

he was

not

a member of a gang and that he preferred to be housed

in the general jail population. Further, his arrest was for resisting

arrest, an offense that has no apparent connection to gang activity.

Throughout our audit, law enforcement officials offered their

perspective that inclusion in CalGang is of little impact to

individuals because CalGang only points to source documentation.

According to CalGang policy, information in the system itself

should not be the basis of expert opinion or statement of fact in

official reports, nor should it be used for any purposes unrelated

to law enforcement, such as employment screenings. However,

we found that these prohibitions are not always followed. In fact,

our search of California appellate cases that included the terms

CalGang

gang database

uncovered at least four unpublished

cases that referred to CalGang as support for expert opinions that

individuals were or were not gang members. Further, three law

enforcement agencies that responded to our statewide survey

admitted to using CalGang for employment or military‑related

screenings. These instances emphasize that inclusion in CalGang

has the potential to seriously affect an individual’s life; therefore,

each entry must be accurate and appropriate.

Because multiple law enforcement agencies can add information to a gang member’s CalGang

record, some of the deficiencies we found relate to information other law enforcement agencies

added to these CalGang records.

The user agencies have not fully

implemented state law requiring

notification to juveniles and their parents

or guardians before adding the juveniles

to CalGang.

CalGang needs an oversight structure

that better ensures that CalGang’s

information is reliable and that its users

adhere to the requirements that protect

individuals’ rights.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

The four user agencies we reviewed might have been able to avoid

making inappropriate CalGang entries had they fully followed the

federal regulations and state guidelines that the committee and

the board voluntarily adopted. For example, the state guidelines

require supervisory reviews of all information for CalGang

entries and annual reviews of all CalGang records to ensure

their accuracy and relevance. However, we found that none of

the four user agencies have the necessary processes in place to

perform these reviews. Further, by requiring only minimal audits

of the information in CalGang, the committee has limited its own

accountability in ensuring that user agencies comply with the

federal regulations and state guidelines. These self‑administered

audits review less than 1 percent of CalGang’s total records. The

committee does not document the audit results, which CalGang

administrators present orally at committee meetings. The limited

nature of these audits is especially concerning because they are the

committee’s only oversight tool, yet they are not robust enough

to ensure that user agencies are maintaining valid and accurate

criminal intelligence records, adhering to security protocols, and

upholding individuals’ rights to privacy.

In addition to the errors we found in the 100 records we reviewed,

our use of an electronic analysis of all CalGang records uncovered

a number of problems that highlight the importance of both

supervisory and ongoing reviews of CalGang information. For

example, we found 42 individuals in CalGang who were supposedly

younger than one year of age at the time of entry—28 of whom

were entered for “admitting to being gang members.” We also found

a significant number of individuals with illogical record purge

dates—the dates by which the individuals’ records must be deleted

from CalGang. Mirroring the federal regulations, CalGang policy

requires that individuals’ records be purged five years after their

dates of entry unless user agencies have entered subsequent criteria

which resets the five‑

year period. Nevertheless, we found more

than 600 individuals with purge dates that were well beyond the

five year limit; in fact, more than 250 individuals in CalGang had

purge dates more than 100 years in the future. By failing to review

information before and after its entry into CalGang, the committee

and user agencies diminish the system’s crime‑fighting value and do

not adequately protect the privacy of those who have been entered

into the system.

Further, the user agencies we reviewed have not fully implemented

a state law that took effect in January 2014 that generally requires

law enforcement agencies to notify juveniles and their parents

or guardians (parents) before adding the juveniles to a shared

gang database such as CalGang. As a result, many juveniles and

their parents were not afforded the right to contest the juveniles’

gang designations. Los Angeles and Santa Ana continued to add

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

juveniles to CalGang after January 2014, but these two user agencies

failed to provide proper notification for more than 70 percent of

the 129 juvenile records we reviewed. Further, the two agencies

did not provide the juveniles and parents who were sent notices

with enough information to reasonably contest the juveniles’

gang designations. Possibly as a result of insufficient information,

we found that few juveniles or parents have contested juveniles’

inclusion in CalGang. The other two user agencies we reviewed—

Santa Clara and Sonoma—did not add juveniles to CalGang once

the notification law took effect.

Because of its potential to enhance public safety, CalGang needs

an oversight structure that better ensures that the information

entered into it is reliable and that its users adhere to requirements

that protect individuals’ rights. To this end, we believe the

Legislature should adopt state law that specifies that CalGang, or

any equivalent statewide shared gang database, must operate under

defined requirements that include the federal regulations and key

safeguards from the state guidelines, such as supervisory and

periodic record reviews. Further, we believe the Legislature

should assign Justice the responsibility for overseeing CalGang

and for ensuring that the law enforcement agencies that use

CalGang comply with the requirements. Establishing Justice as

a centralized oversight entity responsible for determining best

practices and holding user agencies accountable for implementing

such practices will help ensure CalGang’s accuracy and safeguard

individuals’ privacy protection. Moreover, we recommend that

the Legislature create a technical advisory committee to provide

Justice with information about database best practices, usage, and

needs to ensure that CalGang remains a useful law enforcement

tool. Figure 6 on page 54 illustrates what, in our view, would be a

stronger oversight structure for CalGang.

Recommendations

The Legislature

To ensure that CalGang, or any equivalent statewide shared gang

database, has an oversight structure that supports accountability

for proper database use and for protecting individuals’ rights, the

Legislature should do the following:

•

Designate Justice as the state agency responsible for

administering and overseeing CalGang or any equivalent

statewide shared gang database.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Justice

As the Legislature considers creating a public program for shared

gang database oversight and accountability, Justice should guide the

board and the committee to identify and address the shortcomings

that exist in CalGang’s current operations and oversight. The

guidance Justice provides to the board and the committee should

address, but not be limited to, the following areas:

•

Developing best practices based on the requirements stated in

the federal regulations, the state guidelines and state law, and

advising user agencies on the implementation of those practices

by June 30, 2017.

•

Instructing user agencies to complete a comprehensive review

of all the gangs documented in CalGang to determine if they

meet the necessary requirements for inclusion and to purge from

CalGang any groups that do not meet the requirements. Justice

should guide the board and the committee to ensure that user

agencies complete this review in phases, with the final phase

completed by June 30, 2018.

•

Instructing user agencies to complete a comprehensive review

of the records in CalGang to determine if the user agencies

have adequate support for the criteria associated with all the

individuals they have entered as gang members. If the user

agencies do not have adequate support, they should immediately

purge the criteria—and, if necessary, the individuals—from

CalGang. In addition, the user agencies should ensure that all

the fields in each CalGang record are accurate. Justice should

guide the board and the committee to ensure that user agencies

complete this review in phases, with the final phase completed

by September 30, 2019.

To promote transparency and hold the board, the committee,

and user agencies accountable for implementing and adhering

to criminal intelligence safeguards, Justice should post quarterly

reports on its website beginning June 30, 2017, that summarize

how it has guided the board and the committee to implement and

adhere to criminal intelligence safeguards; the progress the board,

the committee, and the user agencies have made in implementing

and adhering to these safeguards; the steps these entities still must

take to implement these safeguards; and any barriers to the board’s

and the committee’s success.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

To promote transparency and encourage public participation in

CalGang’s meetings, Justice should post summary audit results,

meeting agendas, and meeting minutes to its website, unless doing

so would compromise criminal intelligence information or other

information that must be shielded from public release.

Law Enforcement Agencies

Until they receive further direction from the board, the committee,

or Justice, the law enforcement agencies we reviewed—Los Angeles,

Santa Ana, Santa Clara, and Sonoma—should address the specific

deficiencies we found by taking the following actions:

•

Begin reviewing the gangs they have entered into CalGang

to ensure the gangs meet reasonable suspicion requirements.

They should also begin reviewing the gang members they

have entered into CalGang to ensure the existence of proper

support for each criterion. They should purge from CalGang any

records for gangs or gang members that do not meet the criteria

for entry. Individuals who are independent from the ongoing

administration and use of CalGang should lead this review.

•

Develop or modify as necessary, and fully implement by

March 31, 2017, all their policies and procedures related to

CalGang to ensure they align with state law, CalGang policy,

the federal regulations, and the state guidelines.

Agency Comments

Justice responded to the audit stating that it agreed with all of

the recommendations. Justice expressed that it will work with the

board and the committee in various capacities to implement

the recommendations. However, Justice stated that it believes

it needs express authority and additional resources from the

Legislature to assume oversight of CalGang.

Los Angeles, Santa Ana and Santa Clara all indicated that they

agreed with the recommendations and would take the steps

necessary to implement them.

Sonoma disagreed with the audit’s findings and took exception to

the criteria the audit relied upon. Sonoma stated that it believes it

has met or exceeded the statutory guidelines for administering a

model criminal intelligence system. Sonoma also stated that if

it follows the report’s recommendations it will be forced to stop

operating as a node administrative agency.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

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California State Auditor Report 2015-130

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Introduction

Background

Criminal street gangs in California commit a multitude of crimes

and employ violence to expand their criminal enterprises. The

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2011

National Gang Threat

Assessment

states that gang members are responsible for an average

of 48 percent of violent crime in most jurisdictions and up to

90 percent in others. According to a report the California Attorney

General released in 2014 titled

Gangs Beyond Borders

, gang

membership increased by 40 percent nationally between 2009 and

2011, leading to higher levels of violent crime within California—

particularly assault, extortion, home invasion, homicide,

intimidation, and shootings—as well as increases both in arrests

for human trafficking offenses and in seizures of drugs, weapons,

and cash. Although gang populations are heavily concentrated

in Southern California counties—Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside,

San Bernardino, and San Diego—gangs exist in communities across

the State, as Figure 1 on the following page shows.

The CalGang Criminal Intelligence System

With funding from the Office of Criminal Justice Planning, CSRA

International, Inc. (CSRA) developed the proprietary CalGang

software in 1997.

The system provides current gang information

to law enforcement agencies that choose to use it (user agencies),

ideally allowing those agencies to improve the efficiency of their

criminal investigations, enhance officer safety, and better protect

the public. Because CalGang allows user agencies to collect, store,

and share intelligence information about individuals suspected—

but not necessarily convicted—of being involved in criminal

activity, it qualifies as a criminal intelligence system under Title 28,

Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23 (federal regulations). These

federal regulations—which CalGang’s oversight entities voluntarily

choose to follow—state that criminal intelligence entries must

be supported by reasonable suspicion that an individual or

organization is involved in criminal conduct or activity and that

the information entered into the system must be relevant to

that criminal conduct or activity.

CalGang is also known as GangNet, a system that federal law enforcement agencies, other states,

and Canada use.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Figure 1

CalGang Regional Nodes and California Counties’ Gang Member and Affiliate Populations

VENTURA

SANT

A BARBARA

SAN LUIS OBISPO

SAN BERNARDINO

RIVERSIDE

ORANGE

SANT

A CRUZ

SANT

ARA

SAN

BENIT

MONTEREY

LOS

ANGELES

KERN

SAN DIEGO

IMPERIAL

TUOLUMNE

TUL

ARE

ANISL

AUS

SAN

JOAQUIN

MONO

MERCED

MARIPOSA

MADERA

KINGS

INYO

FRESNO

CAL

AVERAS

AMADOR

ALPINE

YUBA

YOLO

TRINITY

TEHAMA

SUTTER

SONOMA

SOL

ANO

SISKIYOU

SIERRA

SHAST

SAN MA

TEO

SAN FRANCISCO

SACRAMENT

PLUMAS

ACER

NEV

ADA

NAP

MODOC

MENDOCINO

LASSEN

LAKE

HUMBOLDT

GLENN

DORADO

DEL

NOR

CONTRA

COST

COLUSA

BUTTE

AMEDA

More than 10,000

5,001–10,000

2,501–5,000

501–2,500

Less than 500

Node Administrator Agency

Number of

Gang Members and Affiliates

Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office

San Diego Police Department

San Jose Police Department

Santa Barbara Police Department

Fresno County Sheriff ’s Office

San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office

Riverside County Sheriff ’s Department,

Riverside County District Attorney’s

Office, and Riverside Police Department

Kern County Sheriff ’s Office

Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department with

the Los Angeles Police Department

Orange County District Attorney’s Office

MARIN

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of CalGang data obtained from the California Department of Justice as of November 23, 2015, and

documents obtained from the California Gang Node Advisory Committee.

Note:

We assigned gang members and affiliates based on the location of the law enforcement agency that initially entered them into CalGang.

We excluded 1,797 individuals for whom we did not have valid county information.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

A person can be entered into CalGang either as a documented

gang member or as an affiliate (an individual who is known to

associate with active gang members and whom a law enforcement

officer reasonably suspects may be involved in criminal activity

or enterprise). As of November 2015, more than 150,000 people

were in CalGang, and the average length of time they had been in

CalGang was five and a half years. Table 1 summarizes the number

of people that law enforcement agencies added and removed from

CalGang since January 2010 and shows that more people have been

removed from than added to CalGang since 2011.

Table 1

Number of Gang Members and Affiliates Added to and Removed From CalGang From 2010 Through 2015

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015*

ADDITIONS

Affiliates

3,534

3,419

2,337

1,829

1,717

1,444

Gang members

26,518

21,269

18,209

15,331

15,890

13,490

Total additions

30,052

24,688

20,546

17,160

17,607

14,934

REMOVALS

Affiliates purged

2,946

3,238

4,142

4,617

4,043

3,801

Affiliates manually deleted

Gang members purged

16,790

23,102

25,391

28,275

30,695

29,461

Gang members manually deleted

769

374

221

152

184

150

Total removals

20,568

26,769

29,797

33,059

34,937

33,431

Source:

California State Auditor’s analysis of CalGang data obtained from the California Department of Justice as of November 23, 2015.

Our analysis for 2015 was limited to additions and removals that occurred as of November 23, 2015.

CalGang is what is called a

pointer

system; the records within it

point—or refer—to documents outside of CalGang that contain

information about suspected gang members and their affiliates,

such as arrest reports, reports of interactions with law enforcement

officers in the field, and booking photographs. Using those documents

and in‑person observations, law enforcement agency staff—generally

gang enforcement officers or administrative staff—record in CalGang

various data points about gang members, including their names,

birth dates, races, genders, known addresses, vehicles, physical

descriptors, and personal markings such as tattoos. CalGang also

captures information specific to gang culture, such as monikers,

aliases, gang symbols, gang colors, gang territories, weapons, drugs,

and gang affiliates. However, law enforcement agencies must use the

information contained in records external to CalGang as the bases for

any official actions, such as arrests or applications for search warrants,

rather than the entries in CalGang itself. Figure 2 on the following

page shows demographic information for individuals in CalGang by

race, gender, and age.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Figure 2

Proportion of Gang Members and Affiliates in CalGang by Race, Gender, and Age

GENDER

FEMALE

93 .1

MALE

0 .1

NOT IDENTIFIED

RACE

64.9

HISPANIC

20.5

BLACK

8.2

WHITE

0.6

OTHER*

3.5

NOT IDENTIFIED

2.3

ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER

AGE

5 7. 3

18–30 years

33.6

31–45 years

1.7

Under 18 years

7. 4

Over 45 years

Source:

California State Auditor’s analysis of CalGang data obtained from the California Department

of Justice as of November 23, 2015.

Other

includes African, American Indian, and people of two or more races.

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CalGang is the primary shared gang database law enforcement

agencies use throughout the State. When we surveyed law

enforcement agencies statewide, 92 percent of respondents asserted

that CalGang was the only shared gang database their agencies

used. When we reviewed information provided by the remaining

8 percent of respondents, we were able to verify only one additional

shared gang database: the Sacramento County Known Persons File.

However, just one law enforcement agency reported that many

agencies within Sacramento County use this shared gang database.

We describe our survey approach and analyze selected responses in

Appendix A beginning on page 61.

CalGang’s Oversight Entities and Costs

Several different entities are responsible for aspects of CalGang’s

funding, operation, and oversight. Specifically, the CalGang

Executive Board (board) and the California Gang Node Advisory

Committee (committee) are the system’s two informal governing

bodies. These two governing bodies work with 10 local agencies

called

node administrator agencies

, as we discuss below. In addition,

the California Department of Justice (Justice) helps to administer

CalGang by funding its annual software maintenance contract with

CSRA and providing technology and infrastructure support.

CalGang’s board is composed of 15 total voting members representing

node administrator agencies, Justice, and three statewide law

enforcement associations.

According to the board’s bylaws, its

objectives and purposes include providing oversight and policy

direction, ensuring CalGang performs its intended functions,

facilitating funding, and ensuring compliance with local, state,

and federal standards. According to the board’s bylaws, the board

elects a chairperson annually from the 15 voting members, and that

chairperson appoints a vice chairperson. The board’s officers may

serve consecutive terms. The bylaws direct the board to meet in

conjunction with the committee or as needed.

Members of the committee act as CalGang operational subject

matter experts. The committee’s bylaws establish that each

node administrator agency can designate one voting committee

member and that the Justice representative also acts as a voting

committee member.

Only voting members may serve as

the committee’s chairperson, vice chairperson, and sergeant at

The Los Angeles node has two voting members—the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department

and the Los Angeles Police Department.

California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) is listed as a voting member in the

committee’s bylaws. However, CalEMA has not been represented at committee meetings

since 2011, and the board voted to remove it as a voting member in 2014

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

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federal regulations and state guidelines.

The requirements include

node administrator agency and CalGang user agency training,

system audit and record purges, and information security and

dissemination. CalGang policy also states that only properly trained

individuals may access CalGang. We describe these requirements in

more detail in the Audit Results.

CalGang policy also specifies the criteria that individuals must meet

before user agencies can add them to CalGang. Before a CalGang

user can add an individual to CalGang as a gang member, a trained

law enforcement officer generally must affirm that the individual

meets at least two gang membership criteria. As shown in Table 2,

these criteria include admitting to gang membership, being affiliated

with known gang members, and exhibiting gang clothing or behavior.

As previously discussed, a user can also add an individual as a gang

affiliate if a law enforcement officer suspects the individual is involved

in criminal activity and he or she affiliates with a documented gang

member. According to CalGang policy, users must have sufficient

source documentation to support CalGang entries.

Table 2

The Frequency With Which Law Enforcement Agencies Used Criteria When

Initially Entering Individuals Into CalGang

CRITERIA

(REASONS FOR ENTERING AN INDIVIDUAL INTO CALGANG)

FREQUENCY OF USE

FOR INITIAL ENTRY

Subject has admitted to being a gang member.

58%

Subject has been seen associating with documented gang members.

Subject is known to have gang tattoos.

Subject has been seen frequenting gang areas.

Subject has been seen wearing gang dress.

In-custody classification interview.*

Subject has been arrested for offenses consistent with usual gang activity.

Subject has been seen displaying gang symbols and/or hand signs.

Subject has been identified as a gang member by a reliable informant/source.

10.

Subject has been identified as a gang member by an untested informant.

Sources:

Policy and Procedures for the CalGang System, California Gang Node Advisory Committee;

and California State Auditor’s analysis of CalGang data obtained from the California Department of

Justice as of November 23, 2015.

Admission of gang membership during a custody classification interview is the one exception to

the two

-criteria requirement.

According to Los Angeles, at the May 2016 committee meeting, the committee voted to remove

the State guidelines from its requirements. However, as of July 28, 2016 the board had not voted

on this recommendation.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Effective January 1, 2014, state law requires that if law enforcement

agencies wish to enter juveniles—defined as individuals younger

than 18 years of age—into a shared gang database such as CalGang,

the user agencies must first notify the juveniles and their parents

or guardians in writing. Because those who receive the letters

have a right to contest the gang designation, this notification

should explain the juveniles’ rights to contest the gang designation.

However, if the user agencies determine that notifications will

compromise active criminal investigations or the juveniles’ health

or safety, they are not required to provide the notifications or

supply information to juveniles or their parents or guardians. We

address the law’s requirements in more detail in the Audit Results.

Privacy Protections for Californians

Justice stated in the state guidelines that law enforcement agencies

can collect criminal intelligence information for legitimate law

enforcement purposes; the trade‑off, however, is that doing so

potentially violates individuals’ privacy and other constitutional

rights. The right to privacy is an implied constitutional right under

the United States Constitution and an express constitutional right

under the California Constitution. Therefore, both the federal

regulations and the state guidelines establish certain standards for

how law enforcement agencies may collect, maintain, and share

criminal intelligence in a way that protects the privacy rights

of the individuals in the intelligence files. Because the board

and committee adopted requirements indicating that CalGang

will comply with the federal regulations and state guidelines,

these two bodies have a responsibility to develop processes

to ensure CalGang operates according to those requirements.

In addition, CalGang user agencies have a responsibility to

thoroughly understand and follow the requirements.

Academics and citizen advocacy groups have expressed concerns

about how collecting and storing criminal intelligence in a database

such as CalGang can impinge on individuals’ rights. Many of

these concerns relate to the discretion law enforcement agencies

have in classifying groups of individuals as gangs and individuals

as gang members. In particular, academic literature suggests that

the broad criteria used to label gangs and gang members may

make it difficult for youth living in gang‑heavy communities to

avoid meeting the qualifying criteria and that gang labeling can

stigmatize minority, inner‑city youth, limiting their social and

economic opportunities. In addition, other critics have expressed

concerns that collecting and disseminating criminal intelligence

may infringe upon individuals’ constitutional rights, including the

rights to free speech, to peaceably assemble, to protection from

illegal search and seizure, and to equal protection under the law.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Ultimately, California’s law enforcement agencies must balance

the need to protect individuals’ rights with the need to protect the

public from crime caused by gangs. The law enforcement agencies

can achieve this balance only through rigorous processes designed

to ensure the information they maintain in CalGang is accurate and

lawfully obtained.

Scope and Methodology

The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (Audit Committee)

directed the California State Auditor to conduct an audit to

understand the State’s adherence to relevant laws related

to protecting the rights of individuals for whom information

is entered into and removed from CalGang. It also asked us to

determine the extent to which agencies across the State use CalGang.

Table 3 on the following pages lists the 15 objectives that the Audit

Committee approved and the methods we used to address them.

Assessment of Data Reliability

In performing this audit, we obtained electronic data files extracted

from CalGang as of November 23, 2015. The U.S. Government

Accountability Office (GAO), whose standards we are statutorily

required to follow, requires us to assess the sufficiency and

appropriateness of computer‑processed information that we use

to support our findings, conclusions, or recommendations. To

accomplish this assessment, we performed data‑set verification and

electronic testing of key data elements and identified significant

issues. As we discuss in the Audit Results, we found many instances

of questionable data entries related to individuals’ birthdates,

criteria dates, purge dates, and individuals’ location information.

We also conducted accuracy testing for a selection of 563 criteria

entries pertaining to 100 individuals in the CalGang data and

found that 23 percent were not adequately supported. Moreover,

we identified concerns over the existing controls that safeguard

CalGang information from inappropriate access and man‑made

or natural disasters.

Due to these deficiencies, we did not perform further testing of

the CalGang data, such as completeness testing. Consequently,

additional weaknesses may exist that we did not identify during

our review. As a result of the pervasive deficiencies identified, we

determined that the CalGang data are not sufficiently reliable.

Although our determination may affect the precision of the numbers

we present, sufficient evidence in total exists to support our audit

findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this report.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Table 3

Audit Objectives and the Methods Used to Address Them

AUDIT OBJECTIVE

METHOD

Review and evaluate the laws, rules,

and regulations significant to the

audit objectives.

We identified relevant federal regulations; state laws and guidelines; CalGang

agreements; CalGang Executive Board (board) bylaws; the California Gang Node

Advisory Committee (committee) bylaws; CalGang policies and procedures; and other

background materials.

Identify the number of gang database

systems that exist in California and the

extent to which they are used by agencies.

See

Method

related to Audit Objective 13.

Identify and evaluate the roles and

responsibilities of the California Department

of Justice (Justice), the committee, the

board, and any other agencies involved in

the management and oversight of CalGang,

including the level of training provided to

program administrators and operators

to implement the CalGang program and

ensure it complies with the law.

• We reviewed relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, CalGang agreements, the board’s

and the committee’s bylaws, and CalGang policies and procedures.

• We interviewed key officials with Justice, the board, the committee, and with the four law

enforcement agencies we selected for review—Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles),

Santa Ana Police Department (Santa Ana), Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office (Santa Clara), and

Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office (Sonoma).

• In selecting the four law enforcement agencies, we considered the following factors: agency

location, number of gang members and CalGang users based on the CalGang data set

described in

Method

related to Audit Objective 4, and whether the agency responded to our

survey. The survey is described further in

Method

related to Audit Objective 13.

• We assessed CalGang’s oversight structure in relation to key requirements specified in the federal

regulations and in other pertinent requirements.

• We assessed whether the committee fulfilled its responsibilities related to training materials per

the CalGang policies and procedures.

• We determined whether two node administrator agencies—Los Angeles and Sonoma—fulfilled

their responsibilities related to training materials per the CalGang policies and procedures,

including reviewing their training materials to determine whether the materials covered all

required topics.

Assess whether and to what extent access

to and the release of data in CalGang

is tracked and monitored to ensure all

applicable laws, regulations, and policies

and procedures are consistently followed.

To the extent possible, determine

the following for the latest year such

information is available:

• We reviewed relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, and CalGang policies and

procedures. We interviewed key officials at Justice, the board, the committee, and the

four law enforcement agencies we selected for review.

• We reviewed requests for information Justice and the four law enforcement agencies

received and responded to generally between January 1, 2011, and early March 2016, to

determine whether they released CalGang data in accordance with applicable requirements.

• We obtained a filtered extract of data entered by California law enforcement entities into

CalGang as of November 23, 2015. We conducted all of the analyses of the CalGang data we

describe throughout this report using this limited data set.

• We identified individuals in CalGang data whose birthdates indicated that they were under

the age of 18 upon initial entry into the system.

• CalGang data does not track all juvenile notifications. For review purposes, we relied on

the notifications each law enforcement agency we reviewed had in its files. Also, as part of

our statewide survey, we asked law enforcement agencies to report the number of juvenile

notifications they made between January 1, 2014, and October 31, 2015.

• We calculated the average length of time individuals were in CalGang as of

November 23, 2015.

The number of requests for information

and the purpose of each request.

The number of juveniles added to the

system since January 1, 2014, and

the number of related notifications

made in accordance with Senate Bill 458

(Chapter 797, Statutes 2013) (SB458).

The length of time each individual has

been in CalGang.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

AUDIT OBJECTIVE

METHOD

For the most recent five years that data

are available and to the extent possible,

determine the following:

• We calculated the number of individuals added to and removed from CalGang data annually

from January 1, 2010, through November 23, 2015.

• We reviewed relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, and CalGang policies and

procedures. We determined that no requirements pertaining to notifying adults added to or

removed from CalGang currently exist.

• We analyzed available demographics for individuals in the CalGang data.

• We reviewed policy and procedures as available from the four law enforcement agencies as

well as other pertinent documents.

• We interviewed key officials at the four law enforcement agencies and determined that

those agencies generally do not track or keep records of adult or juvenile requests for

removal from the CalGang system. Also, as part of our statewide survey, we asked law

enforcement agencies to report the number of requests for removal they received and the

outcome of each.

• We analyzed the frequency of the criterion used by law enforcement agencies to initially

enter individuals into CalGang.

a. The number of people added

to and removed from CalGang by year

and whether they were notified of

such action.

Demographics of individuals in CalGang,

including age, gender, race, ethnicity,

and geographic location.

Number of requests for removal from

CalGang received and the outcome

of each.

Number of juvenile appeals for removal

received and the outcome of each.

e. The criteria used for adding each individual

to the system during this period.

Determine whether individuals are

removed from CalGang consistent with any

guidelines established in law, regulations,

and policies.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, CalGang policies and

procedures, and policies and procedures of the law enforcement agencies, as well as other

pertinent documents.

• We interviewed key officials at the four law enforcement agencies.

• We assessed whether CalGang automatically removes individuals from CalGang after

five years if individuals do not meet additional entry criteria.

Review and assess any evaluations of

CalGang that have been conducted to

determine its effectiveness in achieving its

intended purpose.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, CalGang policies and

procedures, and committee meeting minutes.

• We interviewed key officials at Justice, the board, the committee, and the four local law

enforcement agencies we selected for review and other key local officials.

• We performed web searches to determine whether CalGang studies, reviews, evaluations, or

audits have been performed and reported.

• We assessed committee audits and the committee’s audit processes to determine whether

the audits were effective.

• We reviewed committee meeting minutes to determine what information node

administrators reported and documented, including audit findings and how those findings

were resolved.

Determine the annual cost of CalGang and

identify the major categories of expenditure.

• We interviewed key officials at Justice.

• We reviewed CalGang contracts and project cost documentation for fiscal years 2012–13

through 2014–15.

• As part of our statewide survey, we asked law enforcement agencies to report their costs for

administering and using CalGang.

Determine whether policies and procedures

exist to prevent, detect, and address

possible conflicts of interest specific to

contracting and spending related to the

administration of CalGang.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, CalGang policies and

procedures, and the

State Contracting Manual

. We also reviewed Justice’s purchasing

authority and pertinent documentation it maintained related to its contract with CSRA

International, Inc.

• We determined that Justice’s contract with CSRA International is low risk and that the

contract itself is over twenty years old.

continued on next page . . .

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

AUDIT OBJECTIVE

METHOD

At a selection of law enforcement agencies,

evaluate law enforcement’s compliance with

relevant laws and policies governing gang

database systems.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state guidelines, and CalGang policies and

procedures, and other pertinent documents.

• We interviewed key officials with the four selected law enforcement agencies.

• At the law enforcement agencies we selected for review, we assessed their compliance with

selected administrative safeguards outlined in federal regulations, the state guidelines, and

other pertinent requirements.

• At Sonoma, Los Angeles, and the node administrators for Santa Clara and Santa Ana—

the San Jose Police Department and the Orange County District Attorney’s Office

respectively—we reviewed compliance with selected technical and physical safeguards

outlined in federal regulations.

• At the four law enforcement agencies, we reviewed a selection of gangs to determine

whether they met gang criteria when law enforcement entered them into CalGang

and whether they currently meet gang criteria.

At a selection of local law enforcement

agencies and for the most recent five years,

identify the criteria being used to designate

a person as a gang member for inclusion

in CalGang and determine if the criteria

align with the intended purpose of CalGang

and with the definition of gang or gang

member codified in Section 186.22 of

the California Penal Code. To the extent

possible, determine how frequently each

criterion has been used to identify someone

as a gang member.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state law, state guidelines, CalGang policies

and procedures, and policies and procedures of the law enforcement agencies, as well as

other pertinent documents.

• We interviewed key officials with the four selected law enforcement agencies and reviewed

pertinent documents to determine what criteria the agencies use for designating individuals

as gang members.

• We assessed whether CalGang criteria the four local law enforcement agencies use align

with CalGang’s purpose and with the definition of “criminal street gang.” We determined the

four local law enforcement agencies are not using additional criteria to enter individuals

into CalGang.

• We analyzed the frequency of the criteria used by law enforcement agencies to initially enter

individuals into CalGang.

Determine how those with oversight

responsibility ensure the following:

• We interviewed key officials with Justice, the board, and the committee.

• We reviewed the relevant federal regulations, state law, state guidelines, CalGang policies

and procedures, and board and committee meeting minutes.

• We evaluated CalGang’s oversight structure against common characteristics of

government programs.

• We assessed committee audits and the committee’s audit processes to determine whether

the audits were effective.

• We reviewed committee meeting minutes to determine what information node

administrators reported and documented, including audit findings and how those findings

were resolved.

CalGang operates in compliance with all

relevant laws, regulations, and policies

and procedures.

The information included in CalGang is

current, accurate, and reliable.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

AUDIT OBJECTIVE

METHOD

Survey local law enforcement agencies

and visit selected local law enforcement

agencies to determine the following:

• We surveyed 329 local and state law enforcement agencies, including county sheriff ’s offices,

city police departments, school district police departments, and selected state agencies.

Appendix A on page 61 further describes how we selected agencies to survey.

• The survey questions covered topics such as the extent of the agencies’ use of CalGang; their

training; their processes for adult and juvenile entry, notification, and removal from CalGang;

their information requests; and their use of other shared gang databases.

• We performed related analyses, including items a through d for this objective.

• The survey responses were self-reported, and, except as noted, we did not verify the

accuracy of the responses. We clarified survey responses agencies provided about shared

gang databases and information requests related to employment.

Whether the law enforcement employees

who use CalGang are adequately trained

to implement the program and ensure

full compliance with the law.

Whether the policies and procedures

local law enforcement agencies have

put in place are adequate for ensuring

compliance with SB 458 and other

applicable laws.

How many requests for removal from

CalGang have been submitted over the

past five years and the outcomes of

these requests.

How many juvenile appeals have been

made since the approval of SB458 and

how many names have been removed

through this appeal process.

To the extent possible, evaluate the

accuracy and completeness of the CalGang

data, as well as the types of documentation

maintained to support information entered

into CalGang.

We selected 100 individuals (25 from each of the local law enforcement agencies we reviewed)

recorded in CalGang and evaluated the accuracy of criteria entries by analyzing supporting

documentation. As we discuss in the Assessment of Data Reliability on page 17, we did not test

the completeness of CalGang.

Review and assess any other issues that are

significant to the audit.

We did not identify any other issues that were significant to the audit.

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of Joint Legislative Audit Committee audit request number 2015-130, and information and documentation

identified in the Table column titled

Method

Audit Results

Due to an Inadequate Leadership Structure, CalGang Has Failed to

Comply With Requirements Designed to Protect Individuals’ Rights

to Privacy

The California Department of Justice (Justice) funds CalGang.

However, two bodies composed of law enforcement officials—the

CalGang Executive Board (board) and its technical subcommittee,

the California Gang Node Advisory Committee (committee)—are

responsible for overseeing the CalGang database. These bodies

operate free from the typical safeguards that are the foundation

of government programs. When the board and the committee

voluntarily adopted federal and state criminal intelligence

requirements, they expressed a commitment to protect individuals’

privacy rights and maintain a high‑quality tool for law enforcement

to use to suppress and solve gang crime. However, these entities

lack the organizational structure and processes necessary to

ensure that CalGang achieves these objectives.

Since state funding supports CalGang and law enforcement

agencies statewide use it, we expected to find in place a state

law establishing the powers, legal authority, and responsibilities

that would ensure CalGang’s leadership structure and processes

reflect the characteristics common to public programs. However,

CalGang was not created in statute, and Justice is not statutorily

required to oversee it. Thus, the board and the committee have

assumed responsibility for managing and overseeing CalGang

and its user agencies. Because of the value of CalGang to local

law enforcement agencies, Justice voluntarily funds it and

provides technical support as needed. Nonetheless, Justice’s

involvement with those bodies is inconsistent despite holding a

voting seat on both the board and the committee. For example,

since 2010 Justice has not been represented at one‑third of

the board’s meetings. We asked Justice about its not attending

certain board meetings, and Justice officials explained that it found

limited value in attending these meetings because board members

viewed Justice’s role narrowly and as limited to providing technical

support and funding for CalGang. Justice’s views on policy and

governance were not given meaningful consideration by the board

or the committee. Although Justice could have refused to renew

the CalGang maintenance contract, this was not viewed as a viable

option because it would likely have caused the program to shut down.

Justice told us that it did not at that time have any other leverage

over CalGang to ensure that its input was given any weight.

The board and the committee act without statutory authority,

transparency, or meaningful opportunities for public engagement.

Table 4 summarizes the characteristics common to government

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

agencies and demonstrates the degree to which CalGang operates

outside of those characteristics. Government agencies exhibit these

characteristics as a means to gain the public’s trust and to engage

the public in their decision‑making processes. Because CalGang’s

oversight entities operate outside these parameters, their decisions

lack transparency and public input. Specifically, the board and the

committee do not conduct open meetings: They do not provide

public notice of their meetings, post agendas and minutes, or

accept public testimony. Thus, they limit the opportunity for public

understanding and input. For example, Justice posted some of the

board meetings’ minutes and agendas on its website, but the most

recent document is dated May 2014—more than two years ago,

despite there being more recent meetings.

Table 4

Common Characteristics of Government Entities Compared to CalGang’s Current Framework

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

CALGANG’S FRAMEWORK

SCORECARD

Statutorily defined authority and responsibilities.

No responsibilities or authority defined in state law; CalGang is subject

only to rules the CalGang Executive Board (board) and the California Gang

Node Advisory Committee (committee) have adopted and established.

Transparency and opportunities for public participation.

Limited transparency and opportunities for public participation.

Direct reporting to a government agency or department

that has policy, operations, and administrative oversight.

Limited oversight of policies and operations. State government is a

participant with no decision-making authority.

Public input through elections, through an elected body,

or through the composition of governing bodies.

The board and the committee determine their own membership

and leadership.

Accountability established by clearly defining the roles

of oversight entities.

Individuals serve in multiple roles, creating situations in which they

oversee themselves.

Independently audited.

Not audited by an external, independent body. User agencies evaluate

their own records.

Specified revenue sources and, if appropriate, the ability

to collect fees.

No designated revenue source and no authority to collect fees from

user agencies.

Legal representation.

No legal representation.

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of documentation from the Institute of Internal Auditors’

Public Sector Definition

, excerpts from

Strategic

Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations

by John Bryson, excerpts from

Understanding and Managing Public Organizations

by Hal Rainey, and

analysis of the board’s and the committee’s bylaws and minutes and the committee’s policies and procedures.

= CalGang’s framework does not meet this common characteristic of government entities.

= CalGang’s framework only partially meets this common characteristic of government entities.

In addition, CalGang’s leadership structure does not provide

adequate accountability or oversight. Because the board and

the committee determine which law enforcement agencies (also

referred to as

user agencies

) will be node administrator agencies,

they control the composition of their own membership: Once

the board approves a law enforcement agency to be a node

administrator agency, that agency designates individuals to sit

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

on the board and the committee. Moreover, the members of the

board and the committee elect their own leadership. Thus, no

opportunities exist for public input through elections or elected

bodies. Accountability is further compromised because individuals

can serve many roles within the CalGang framework. Table 5

outlines selected responsibilities of these bodies and illustrates

how individuals can serve in multiple oversight roles. For example,

in the Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office (Sonoma), the sergeant

who serves on the committee also acts as a node administrator

and as a CalGang user. In fact, the sergeant stated that he enters

approximately 95 percent of CalGang records for his agency,

yet this same sergeant is also responsible for conducting any

audits of CalGang records for the region because he is the node

administrator. The sergeant’s conflicting roles highlight the current

weaknesses in CalGang’s oversight framework.

Table 5

Selected Responsibilities of CalGang Oversight Entities and User Agencies

COMPOSITION

RESPONSIBILITIES

CalGang Executive

Board (board)

The chief executive or his or her designee from each

of the following: the 11 node administrator agencies,

the California Department of Justice, the California

District Attorneys Association, and the California State

Sheriff ’s Association.

• Pro

vide oversight and policy direction.

•

Approve the creation or abolition of a node.

• Elec

t a chairperson annually.

California Gang Node

Advisory Committee

(committee)

Full-time law enforcement officers or support staff

designated by node administrator agencies, usually

the node administrators.

•

Oversee the operations of law enforcement agencies

(user agencies).

•

Evaluate requests from agencies interested in becoming nodes.

•

Elect a chairperson, vice chairperson, and sergeant of arms

every other year.

Node administrator

agencies

Designated node administrator.

•

Ensure that all users in the node adhere to committee policies.

•

Conduct triannual audits.

•

Examine gangs before they are added to CalGang.

User agencies

Law enforcement or support staff who enter

CalGang data.

•

Comply with committee policies.

•

Ensure data are legal, relevant, accurate, timely, and complete.

Sources:

Board and committee bylaws, committee policies, and interviews with the committee chair.

Although the board and committee voluntarily committed to

adhere to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23 (federal

regulations), which establishes requirements to ensure the privacy

of those whose data is maintained in criminal intelligence systems

such as CalGang, their protocols for implementing the federal

regulations allude to stronger oversight than the entities actually

provide. Specifically, the federal regulations—which are viewed

as the national standard for protecting and handling criminal

intelligence systems—require rules and processes that implement

administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect

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August 2016

criminal intelligence data and individuals’ rights. On the surface,

the committee’s policies and procedures (CalGang policy) appear

to address some of these requirements. However, the board

and the committee have not implemented or followed all of the

necessary processes, as summarized in Table 6. For example, federal

regulations require audits and inspections to ensure that the user

agencies have necessary processes in place to make key decisions,

such as determining that reasonable suspicion exists to support

CalGang entries. However, as we discuss later, we found that the

committee’s audits are neither independent nor robust and that

CalGang policy does not include a provision for on‑site inspections

of records or facilities.

Table 6

CalGang’s Oversight Entities’ Adherence to Federal Regulations for Protecting Criminal Intelligence

SELECTED REQUIREMENTS UNDER TITLE 28,

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, PART 23

CALGANG’

S IMPLEMENTATION

SCORECARD

Administrative Safeguards

Audit and inspect properly trained participating agencies to

ensure that reasonable suspicion exists and that users are

following federal, state, and local laws.

Audits do not adequately review the establishment of reasonable

suspicion or compliance with laws. CalGang’s oversight entities do

not perform on-site inspections.

Adopt procedures to ensure that all information retained in

the database has relevancy and importance.

Procedures do not exist.

Develop rules to implement authority to remove personnel

authorized to access the system.

CalGang’s oversight entities have adopted rules to sanction users.



Technical Safeguards

Store information in a manner such that it cannot be accessed

without authorization.

At the time of our review, the four nodes lacked policies or

procedures for ensuring that user accounts are disabled when

employees transfer or separate from employment.*

‡

Physical Safeguards

Restrict access to its facilities.

The four nodes we reviewed stored the servers containing CalGang

information in locked buildings with limited physical access.



Institute procedures to protect criminal intelligence

information from fire, flood, or other disasters.

CalGang information is regularly backed up to protect from

data loss.



†

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 23; CalGang’s administrative, technical, and physical

oversight processes; and the California Gang Node Advisory Committee’s policies and procedures.



= No significant issues identified.

= Did not adhere to requirements.

We visited four law enforcement agencies—the Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office (Sonoma), the Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office (Santa Clara),

the Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles), and the Santa Ana Police Department (Santa Ana). Two of these agencies—Sonoma and

Los Angeles—are node administrator agencies. The other two agencies—Santa Ana and Santa Clara—are part of the nodes overseen by the

Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the San Jose Police Department, respectively.

†

Although we did not identify any significant issues related to protecting criminal intelligence information from fire, flood, or other disasters, the

nodes we visited did not have adequate plans for restoring the information following a disaster.

‡

Subsequent to our review, Santa Ana’s node administrator provided us with a new procedure for evaluating the validity of its node’s CalGang

user accounts.

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August 2016

Moreover, as Table 6 shows, we have concerns about the user

agencies’ compliance with federal regulations related to safeguarding

CalGang information from unauthorized access. At the node

administrator agencies for each of the four law enforcement agencies

that we reviewed—Sonoma, the Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office

(Santa Clara), the Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles),

and the Santa Ana Police Department (Santa Ana)—we attempted

to review the policies and procedures for removing or modifying

employee CalGang user accounts when the employees transfer or

separate from employment.

However, none of the node administrator

agencies had such policies or procedures at the time of our review.

We found 65 active user accounts across Santa Clara, Los Angeles,

and Sonoma for individuals who no longer worked for the agencies.

Two of these accounts may have been vulnerable to inappropriate

access for more than 11 years following the employees’ departures.

Subsequent to our review, Santa Ana’s node administrator provided us

with a new procedure for evaluating the validity of its node’s CalGang

user accounts.

In addition, although each of the node administrator agencies

we reviewed asserted that they protect their data against loss

by implementing practices such as performing regular backups

of data as federal regulations require, we found that none of the

node administrator agencies have fully documented plans for

restoring CalGang information after a man‑made or natural

disaster. Specifically, neither Santa Ana’s node administrator agency

nor Los Angeles has a contingency plan in place for restoring

CalGang information after a loss of this nature. In contrast,

the node administrators for Sonoma and Santa Clara provided

written agreements with service providers for restoring CalGang

information after a man‑made or natural disaster. However, these

service agreements did not specify how quickly the information

would need to be restored in order to minimize the impact of the

interruption. Industry best practices state that organizations should

develop contingency plans that identify maximum acceptable time

frames during which critical business applications can be inoperable.

Without sufficient planning, the node administrator agencies risk

losing the capability to process and retrieve CalGang information,

which could significantly affect user agencies’ timely access to

gang‑related intelligence information.

Ultimately, the board and the committee have not effectively

communicated the federal regulations and state guidelines to user

agencies. CalGang’s policies state that CalGang will comply with

federal regulations and Justice’s

Model Standards and Procedures

Two of the law enforcement agencies that we reviewed—Sonoma and Los Angeles—are node

administrator agencies. The other two agencies—Santa Ana and Santa Clara—are parts of

the nodes overseen by the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the San Jose Police

Department, respectively, which both function as node administrator agencies.

We have concerns about how law

enforcement agencies safeguard

CalGang information from

unauthorized access. We found

65 active user accounts for former

employees; two accounts were left

open for more than 11 years.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

for Maintaining Criminal Intelligence Files and Criminal Intelligence

Operational Activities

, November 2007 (state guidelines). The state

guidelines provide similar safeguards as the federal regulations but

in certain areas are more restrictive. We expected that CalGang

policy or the agreements that user agencies and their respective node

administrator agencies sign would provide direction on implementing

the requirements for safeguarding data and ensuring they are reliable.

However, CalGang policy does not contain such guidance, and the user

agreements do not reference the specific requirements—in fact, the

agreements are very broad and simply state that user agencies must

comply with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations. Consequently,

the four law enforcement agencies we reviewed did not understand

these requirements. For example, the sergeant at Santa Clara who is

solely responsible for determining whether individuals meet the criteria

for entry into CalGang stated that he was not familiar with the state

guidelines. As we discuss later, we found that the four agencies had not

implemented many of the processes the state guidelines require. The

remainder of this report explores the many examples of broken and

fragmented processes we identified related to CalGang and how these

processes weaken the database and create opportunities for violations of

individuals’ rights.

Law Enforcement Agencies Could Not Always Demonstrate That They

Had Established Reasonable Suspicion That Groups Were Gangs Before

Entering Them Into CalGang

Although CalGang policy requires that all user agencies maintain

sufficient source documentation to support their CalGang entries,

we found that the law enforcement agencies we reviewed were unable

to demonstrate that many of the groups they entered into CalGang met

the criteria necessary for identification as gangs. The federal regulations

and the state guidelines require that law enforcement agencies analyze

legally obtained information to establish reasonable suspicion of

organizations’ criminal activity before adding those organizations to

criminal intelligence databases. To establish reasonable suspicion for

entry into CalGang, the committee requires that law enforcement

agencies ensure that groups meet the definition of a

gang

in CalGang

policy. Figure 3 illustrates in part the criteria a group of three individuals

must meet to be considered a gang. These criteria are important

because after entering a gang into CalGang, a user agency may add

individuals to that gang as gang members.

An individual’s right to

privacy is jeopardized if a law enforcement agency justifies collecting

personal information about that individual by stating that he or she is a

gang member when the agency has not yet established that such a gang

exists through a documented pattern of criminal activity.

Throughout this report, we use the term

gang member

to refer to both gang members and gang

affiliates unless specifically stated otherwise.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

We reviewed a total of nine gangs that Sonoma, Santa Ana, and

Los Angeles had entered into CalGang to determine whether

the user agencies had appropriately established reasonable

suspicion according to the criteria in CalGang policy when the law

enforcement agency entered them.

We identified problems with

Sonoma’s and Santa Ana’s processes for adding new gangs. We

expected that these two agencies would be able to direct us to the

records they analyzed to determine that the group of three or more

individuals had a common sign, symbol, or name and demonstrated

a pattern of criminal gang activity, as depicted in Figure 3. However,

we found that Sonoma and Santa Ana generally relied on summary

statements agency staff provided on forms or in emails that

described how groups met the reasonable suspicion requirements

for CalGang entry. Although through subsequent follow up we

found that these groups

currently

meet the definition of a gang,

neither agency was able to demonstrate which individuals—at

the time of the groups’ initial entry into CalGang—supported the

agencies’ conclusions that the groups met the necessary criteria.

Therefore, neither agency could prove that it performed the analysis

required to establish reasonable suspicion. In contrast, we found

that Los Angeles could support the gang we reviewed. Specifically,

before Los Angeles added the gang into CalGang, it supported that

reasonable suspicion existed by maintaining a list of individuals and

their associated arrests, which together established gang criteria.

Sonoma’s process for adding new gangs to CalGang is of particular

concern to us. The sergeant acting as Sonoma’s node administrator

is responsible for adding gangs for the 30 counties that make up

the Sonoma node, yet he does not collect or analyze the source

documents that support his gang entries. Moreover, he destroys

the summary documentation the agencies within those counties

provide after transferring the information into CalGang. Therefore,

the sergeant could not provide supporting documentation for

any of the four gangs we examined from Sonoma. This approach

increases the risk that he will add groups to CalGang even when

user agencies have not established reasonable suspicion according

to CalGang policy. Once a gang is added to CalGang, all user

agencies in the node, which encompasses Northern California, are

free to collect and share information about individuals they believe

are gang members, potentially violating those individuals’ rights.

Additionally, the committee has not ensured that user agencies

periodically assess gangs to determine whether they continue

to meet the criteria in CalGang policy. The minutes from board

and committee meetings show that nodes periodically query

Santa Clara does not add gangs to CalGang; rather, it links suspected gang members to gangs

already existing in the database. Consequently, it did not have a process for us to review.

Sonoma’s node administrator adds

gangs for 30 other counties, yet

he does not collect or analyze the

source documents that support his

gang entries.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

CalGang data to identify and remove gangs with fewer than

three members. However, this type of limited review does not

confirm that reasonable suspicion continues to exist for larger gangs,

creating the risk that CalGang contains information on individuals

who are alleged members of groups that no longer meet the gang

criteria. Guidance provided by the Institute for Intergovernmental

Research—the criminal intelligence training vendor with which

the federal government contracts—indicates that law enforcement

agencies should periodically validate that reasonable suspicion

exists for a gang within a specified time frame, called a retention

period. According to this guidance, the gang and its members should

generally be purged at the end of this retention period. However, no

retention period for gangs exists in CalGang if reasonable suspicion

can no longer be validated.

As a result, Los Angeles had no information since 2008 in its gang

history records demonstrating that one gang had engaged in a

pattern of criminal activity. To determine whether Los Angeles had

simply neglected to update its history for this gang, we analyzed

CalGang records for its members between 2010 and 2015 and

found Los Angeles’ officers documented only one arrest for offenses

consistent with gang activity. However, we determined through a

review of that individual’s criminal history records that he was not

arrested on the date documented in CalGang. As a result, based on our

review, Los Angeles no longer had sufficient reasonable suspicion in

its gang records or in CalGang to continue to categorize this group as

a gang and the node administrator would not have reviewed the gang

until its membership in CalGang fell below three members.

After we brought this problem to the attention of Los Angeles, its

node administrator researched the gang’s members and provided us

with records of arrests of gang members that law enforcement officers

did not include in the gang’s history or accurately enter into CalGang.

Although some of the offenses Los Angeles directed us to are consistent

with gang activity, we question why Los Angeles failed to enter this

information into CalGang and update its internal gang history. This

example demonstrates why it is important for CalGang user agencies

to establish a retention period and periodically assess whether a gang

continues to meet reasonable suspicion requirements in order to ensure

system accuracy and the protection of individuals’ rights.

Law Enforcement Agencies Do Not Have Adequate Support for Some of

the Individuals and Many of the Criteria They Entered Into CalGang

When law enforcement agencies cannot provide adequate support

for the inclusion of individuals in CalGang, documenting those

individuals’ whereabouts, appearance, and associates in a shared

database could constitute or lead to a violation of their privacy or

It is important for CalGang user

agencies to establish a retention

period and periodically assess

whether a gang continues to meet

reasonable suspicion requirements

in order to ensure system

accuracy and the protection of

individuals’ rights.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

other constitutional rights. Further, the inclusion of inaccurate or

unsupported information in CalGang reduces the system’s value

to law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, when we reviewed a

selection of 100 people included in CalGang, we found that law

enforcement agencies did not have adequate support for inclusion of

13 of these individuals. Additionally, because user agencies can identify

numerous reasons, or criteria, for entering or retaining individuals in

CalGang, we reviewed more than 500 items of criteria associated with

these 100 individuals and found that the user agencies lacked adequate

supporting documentation, such as field notes or arrest report

narratives, for 23 percent of the criteria.

CalGang policy requires, with one exception, that a user agency

identify two documented criteria for initially entering a person into

CalGang.

For the individual to remain in CalGang longer than

five years from the date of original entry, a user agency must enter

subsequent criteria, which will reset the five‑year period from that

date. User agencies generally enter criteria when they have additional

contacts with the individuals. Because user agencies may have

entered numerous criteria for some individuals, those individuals’

inclusion in CalGang may be justifiable even if some of these

criteria are unsupported. As shown in Table 7, we found that 131 of

the 563 (23 percent) items of criteria we reviewed lacked support.

Ultimately, this led us to conclude that law enforcement agencies

did not have adequate support for inclusion in CalGang for 13 of the

100 individuals we reviewed.

Table 7

Four Law Enforcement Agencies’ Support for a Selection of 100 Individuals in CalGang

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

INDIVIDUALS

GANG CRITERIA

NUMBER

REVIEWED

NUMBER

ADEQUATELY

SUPPORTED

NUMBER NOT

ADEQUATELY

SUPPORTED

NUMBER

REVIEWED

NUMBER

ADEQUATELY

SUPPORTED

NUMBER NOT

ADEQUATELY

SUPPORTED

Los Angeles Police Department

213

165

Santa Ana Police Department

104

Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office and

the San Jose Police Department*

127

107

Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office

†

119

Totals

100

563

432

131

Source:

California State Auditor’s review of four law enforcement agencies’ support for 100 people included in CalGang.

The San Jose Police Department is responsible for the majority of the entries we reviewed and the criteria we found to not be adequately supported.

†

Other agencies in the Sonoma County node—excluding Sonoma County Sheriff ’s Office—were responsible for nearly half of the criteria we found to

not be adequately supported.

The only exception to the two

-criteria requirement is when an individual admits to his or her gang

membership during an in-

custody classification interview for jail or prison housing.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

As indicated in Table 8, 31 of the unsupported criteria related to

the criterion “subject has admitted to being a gang member,” while

three related to “in‑custody classification interview,” which are

admissions of gang membership when individuals are brought

into custody and will be confined with other individuals. In these

instances, we found that the source documents either contained

no record of gang membership admissions or, in some instances,

indicated that the individuals said they were not—or not currently—

gang members. For example, Sonoma justified entering a person into

CalGang in part because he supposedly admitted to being a gang

member during a custody classification interview at the county jail.

However, when we obtained a record of this interview, we found that

the person said he was not currently a member of the gang to which

he was later connected in CalGang. In fact, he specifically requested

to not be housed with this gang. The only criterion for this individual’s

inclusion in CalGang for which we found support was that he had

been seen associating with documented gang members. However,

even that circumstance consisted of no more than an officer’s

observation that the individual was in the garage of a residence that

a documented gang member had left. Given that Sonoma did not

have adequate support for any other criteria for this individual, we

concluded that his inclusion in CalGang was inappropriate.

Table 8

Number and Types of CalGang Criteria Entries That Lacked Adequate Support

CRITERIA

NUMBER OF

CRITERIA NOT SUPPORTED

NUMBER OF

CRITERIA REVIEWED

Subject has admitted to being a gang member.

136

Subject has been arrested for offenses consistent with usual gang activity.

Subject has been seen associating with documented gang members.

Subject is known to have gang tattoos.

104

Subject has been identified as a gang member by a reliable informant/source.

Subject has been seen wearing gang dress.

Subject has been seen frequenting gang areas.

Subject has been seen displaying gang symbols and/or hand signs.

In-custody classification interview.

Subject has been identified as a gang member by an untested informant.

Totals

131

563

Source:

California State Auditor’s review of four law enforcement agencies’ support for 100 people included in CalGang, as listed in Table 7 on page 32.

When we asked about these admission‑related entries that did not

match source documents, representatives of the law enforcement

agencies often agreed that the criteria were not accurate and even

purged the information from CalGang. At times they explained that

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

they could have used other field observations they did not record in

CalGang but that were present in the source documents to justify

the individuals’ inclusion in CalGang. However, admitting that they

could or should have entered other criteria into CalGang does not

negate the fact that the system inaccurately reflects individuals’

statements regarding gang membership. For CalGang to be

useful to law enforcement personnel, it should be both complete

and accurate.

We also found 29 instances in which user agencies

were unable to support the criterion “subject has

been arrested for offenses consistent with usual

gang activity.” In fact, in nine of these instances, we

could not find that the person had been arrested

for any offense—despite the use of this criterion to

justify putting the individual in CalGang. For the

remaining 20 entries, we found that the

individuals had been arrested for common crimes

that did not necessarily have any connection to

gang activity, such as probation violations and drug

possession. Although the committee established

the 10 criteria listed in Table 8 on page 33, it did

not implement any policies or procedures further

describing what offenses are consistent with gang

activity. However, the Penal Code contains a list of

offenses that can be used to determine that a group

is a criminal street gang for the purpose of

prosecuting its members, a selection of which are

listed in the text box. Absent any further definition

from the committee or from the user agencies we

reviewed, we used the Penal Code’s categories as a

benchmark for whether individuals’ offenses were,

in fact, consistent with gang activity.

In response to our concern regarding the offenses law enforcement

agencies used for this criterion, Santa Ana agreed to remove

one criteria entry related to loitering and two related to drug

possession. Conversely, the node administrator in Sonoma stated

that we misunderstood the concept of “subjective reasonable

suspicion” and maintained that some of the offenses we were

questioning—violating probation and resisting arrest—are common

among gang members. When we questioned a criteria entry

because the associated offense was the prohibited possession

of ammunition, which the Penal Code does not identify as a

gang‑related offense, the Sonoma node administrator responded

that “possession of ammunition by a gang member is a gang crime.”

The problem presented by both of these responses is that they

presuppose that the individuals in question are gang members and

therefore the offenses for which they were arrested are gang crimes.

Selection of Offenses Used to Establish

a Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity

•

Assault with deadly weapon.

•

Robbery, burglary, and carjacking.

•

Homicide and manslaughter.

•

Sale, or possession for sale, of a controlled substance.

•

Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied

motor vehicle.

• Arson.

•

Rape, torture, and kidnapping.

•

Money laundering and counterfeiting.

•

Intimidation of witnesses and victims.

•

Prohibited possession of firearm.

•

Felony vandalism.

Source:

Penal Code 186.22, Section (e).

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

In our view, offenses need to be indicative of gang activity for user

agencies to justify including individuals in CalGang. Although we

understand law enforcement officers must exercise judgment in

making certain criteria determinations, the results of our testing

suggest that the exercise of this judgment needs to be informed by

specific regulations.

The user agencies were also frequently unable to support the

criterion “subject has been seen associating with documented gang

members.” Specifically, we found 28 criteria entries in which the law

enforcement agencies did not document that the people with whom

the individuals in question were associating were gang members. In

fact, at times we found no record of anyone else even being present

during the events leading to the particular field observations.

In regard to the other unsupported criteria listed in Table 8 on

page 33, we did not question the validity of the law enforcement

officers’ field observations but rather only identified criteria as

unsupported if the source documents lacked such observations

altogether.

For example, if the law enforcement officers indicated

in source documents that geographical locations, tattoos,

symbols, or manner of dress were gang‑related, we accepted these

statements. However, we identified criteria entries as unsupported

if no such statements were present. For example, Los Angeles used

the criterion “subject has been identified as a gang member by a

reliable informant/source” to justify the inclusion of an individual

in CalGang. Upon hearing our concern that the source document

made no mention of an informant or other source, the node

administrator for Los Angeles responded that the “reliable source

would be the officer making the determination.” This interpretation

of what constitutes a “reliable informant/source” is inappropriately

broad and would allow officers to enter this criterion absent

any evidence other than their own views that individuals are

gang members.

We found two primary causes for the inaccurate criteria entries we

identified. Based on their descriptions of their processes for

entering information into CalGang, the user agencies we reviewed

often have administrative staff or other designated officers enter

information into CalGang rather than the officers who made the

field observations. CalGang policy does not prohibit this approach

and we recognize that it can be efficient. However, it may also be

the cause of some of the discrepancies between CalGang entries

and the corresponding source documents. Another contributing

For the criterion “subject has been seen frequenting gang areas,” we accepted the judgment

of those administering CalGang even when the field officers did not specifically record this

observation. Given their unique position of regularly recording or observing CalGang entries,

these administrators are likely to know the geographical locations that gangs frequent.

Although law enforcement officers

must exercise judgment in making

certain criteria determinations,

the results of our testing suggest

that the exercise of this judgment

needs to be informed by

specific regulations.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

factor to the deficiencies we found is the lack of strong oversight

of CalGang. No independent party regularly scrutinizes CalGang

criteria—a condition we detail later in the report.

As a result of these inaccurate criteria entries, law enforcement

agencies are tracking people in CalGang who do not appear to

justifiably belong in the system. Further, the inaccuracies weaken

its value to law enforcement because many of the descriptions in

CalGang do not match the support to which the system is pointing.

If law enforcement agencies later attempt to use this support as

evidence in convictions or

sentencing enhancements

—years added

to a prison term when an individual commits a crime to promote or

assist a gang—they will find that the information was not worth the

time and resources they used to locate and analyze it.

Throughout the audit, law enforcement officials offered their

perspective that inclusion in CalGang is of little impact to an

individual because CalGang only points to source documentation.

CalGang policy prohibits using the system as the basis for expert

opinion or statements of fact in official reports or for non‑law

enforcement purposes, such as employment screenings. However,

we found that neither of these prohibitions is always followed.

In fact, when we searched California appellate cases that

contained the terms

CalGang

gang database

, we found at least

four unpublished cases that referred to CalGang as support for

expert opinions or conclusions in official reports that individuals

were or were not gang members. Further, we found one case

in which a CalGang printout was apparently provided to a jury.

We found numerous other instances in which the unpublished

decisions by the appellate courts cited or otherwise contained

references to CalGang or a gang database. As we discuss later in

this report, three user agencies admitted that they use CalGang

for employment or military‑related screenings. These examples

emphasize that inclusion in CalGang has the potential to seriously

affect a person’s life and therefore the accuracy and appropriate use

of CalGang is of critical importance.

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Appropriate Safeguards to Ensure

the Accuracy and Security of CalGang Records

Law enforcement agencies have failed to ensure that CalGang

records are added, removed, and shared in a way that maintains

the accuracy of the system and safeguards individuals’ rights.

We found that the agencies we examined did not review records

before and after entering them in CalGang and that committee

audits of the information within CalGang lacked independence

and transparency. Moreover, flaws in CalGang’s controls caused

many individuals to remain in the system longer than federal

Inclusion in CalGang has the

potential to seriously affect a

person’s life and therefore the

accuracy and appropriate use of

CalGang is of critical importance.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

regulations allow; in fact, some individuals are currently scheduled

to remain in CalGang for hundreds of years. Finally, in response to

our survey, three agencies reported using CalGang for employment

or military

‑related screenings, which represent an inappropriate

use of the system. We believe that the committee’s failure to

implement standardized training has contributed to user agencies’

inappropriate and inconsistent use of CalGang. In addition, the

committee’s lack of oversight and the user agencies’ lack of sound

processes has increased the risk of inaccuracies in CalGang, which

could jeopardize the effectiveness of investigations and lead to

violations of individuals’ privacy rights.

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Not Established Necessary Processes

for Reviewing and Purging Records

The federal regulations and state guidelines that CalGang

adopted outline the requirements for maintaining individuals’

criminal intelligence records. The requirements that relate to

reviewing records accomplish two objectives: They ensure that the

information in CalGang is accurate, which helps make CalGang

a valuable tool for solving and preventing crimes, and they help

ensure that inaccurate information is not added and that unreliable

and unnecessary information is purged, which protects individuals’

rights. As Figure 3 on page 29 indicates, the federal regulations and

state guidelines require that law enforcement agency supervisors

review and approve criminal intelligence data before entry. The

state guidelines also recommend periodic quality control reviews of

such data and permanently removing data from CalGang if they are

misleading, obsolete, or otherwise unreliable.

However, as Table 9 on the following page shows, the four law

enforcement agencies we reviewed did not have processes in place

to ensure that agency supervisors and quality control reviewers

evaluated records before their entry into CalGang. In fact, three

of the four agencies followed a practice of allowing one law

enforcement officer or analyst to decide unilaterally which suspected

gang members to add to CalGang. In contrast, Los Angeles has

established and generally followed a process requiring that a

supervisor review records before their entry. However, none of

the four agencies annually assessed CalGang records as the state

guidelines require. The Sonoma node administrator explained

that his agency had not implemented these requirements because

they would add unnecessary levels of review that would delay the

entry of information into CalGang. He further stated that until

the agency enters the information, it is not usable intelligence.

However, if Sonoma or other agencies believed that the safeguards

in the state guidelines were too onerous, they should have at least

established other, compensating processes that would ensure the

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Specifically, the audits are limited in focus and it is difficult

to determine if any change resulted. Board meeting minutes

dated January 2006 indicate that the board directed each node

administrator agency to audit 30 records a year, resulting in the

annual review of 330 records statewide. However, this level of

review appears inadequate given that CalGang contains in excess

of 150,000 individuals’ records. Further, the minutes from the

committee’s meetings document that the node administrator

agencies report on the results of their audits, but the minutes lack

sufficient detail of how the agencies addressed the problems they

uncovered. Thus, for the majority of its audits, the committee was

unable to demonstrate the value of its audit process and the related

outcomes. The limited focus of these audits is especially concerning

because they are the only oversight tool that the committee uses,

yet the audits are self‑reported with no independent verification

of the results, resulting in a process that is not robust enough

to ensure that user agencies are maintaining valid and accurate

criminal intelligence records, adhering to security protocols,

and upholding individuals’ rights to privacy. The lack of an

appropriate audit process potentially weakens CalGang’s value

as a law enforcement tool and may contribute to the public’s

concern that law enforcement agencies are mishandling private,

sensitive information.

Our review of CalGang records statewide identified a significant

number of errors that demonstrate the need for stronger controls

over the processes for entering, evaluating, and auditing the data

in CalGang. For example, we found 42 individuals in CalGang

whose birthdates indicated that they were less than one year old at

the time their information was entered, 28 of whom were entered

into the system in part because they admitted to being gang

members. CalGang also contained information that was unusable

for meaningful data analysis, such as telephone numbers, zip codes,

or random characters in the data field intended to capture a city

name. Additionally, we found instances in which city names were

misspelled or abbreviated in inconsistent ways. For example, we

identified more than 100 variations for Los Angeles, including

“Los Angels” and “Los Angeleses.”

We expected that the law enforcement agencies we examined

would be familiar with the state guidelines that the committee

adopted and have the necessary safeguards in place to implement

the related requirements. However, key officials and CalGang

users from Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Santa Clara were all

unaware of the state guidelines and the requirements therein. At

Sonoma, the sergeant who functions as the node administrator

stated that the processes the state guidelines outline were either

not applicable to CalGang, did not have value, or would be too

resource‑intensive to fully implement. We disagree with the

Our review of CalGang records

statewide identified a significant

number of errors that demonstrate

the need for stronger controls

over the processes for entering,

evaluating, and auditing the data

in CalGang.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

sergeant’s assertions because CalGang policy explicitly requires

user agencies to follow the state guidelines. Further, if Sonoma or

other agencies had concerns regarding the processes in the state

guidelines, they should have reconciled them with processes that

were similarly robust but more efficient to implement. Disregarding

the guidelines designed to enhance CalGang’s accuracy and to

preserve individuals’ rights degrades the database and calls into

question user agencies’ commitment to CalGang’s mission—

to provide an accurate resource for law enforcement.

The programming underlying CalGang also may jeopardize

individuals’ privacy rights because it did not purge all records

within the required time frames. User agencies rely upon CalGang’s

automatic purge function to comply with the requirement in

the federal regulations to remove criminal intelligence records if

user agencies have not added new information indicating gang

membership within five years. However, when we searched

104 records for individuals in CalGang to ensure that they had

been purged on schedule, we found that 12 remained in CalGang

even though they did not contain new information that would have

warranted extending their purge dates. In fact, these 12 records

reflected purge dates that should have taken effect in the past.

Santa Clara, which is within the San Jose node, had created all

12 records, but neither Santa Clara’s gang sergeant nor the sergeant

in the gang investigations unit at the San Jose node could offer an

explanation as to why the automatic purge function had exhibited

this operational deficiency. When we checked CalGang again

about three weeks later, the 12 records had been purged. CSRA

International, Inc. (CSRA)—the company that developed the

proprietary CalGang software—indicated that errors with

the San Jose node’s server caused the automatic purge function to

run improperly for approximately two months. CSRA asserted that

it resolved this error and has implemented procedures to quickly

identify similar issues in the future.

Further, as of November 2015, we identified records for

three additional individuals who should have been purged in 2002,

2003, and 2008, respectively. When we asked CSRA why these

individuals were still in CalGang, it identified a programming

error that caused the automated purge process to overlook the

three individuals. Consequently, these individuals’ records remained

in CalGang from seven to 13 years beyond when they should have

been purged. CSRA asserted that it subsequently corrected this

error and would report these three individuals to the appropriate

law enforcement agency for review. As of June 2016, CSRA reported

that these individuals were no longer in CalGang.

The programming underlying

CalGang may jeopardize

individuals’ privacy rights because

it did not purge all records within

the required time frames.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Finally, CalGang’s programming has not at times had sufficient

controls to prevent future dating of entries related to gang

membership or affiliation. This lack of controls—coupled with

law enforcement’s failure to establish a thorough review process

to ensure the accuracy of data entries—could cause individuals to

inappropriately remain in CalGang for several decades, or even

centuries. Specifically, we identified 628 individuals whose records

had purge dates beyond the standard five‑year time period,

including 257 whose records were not scheduled to be purged

for more than 100 years. When we inspected these individuals’

criteria dates—which is the information CalGang software uses to

calculate purge dates—we found that the entries were future‑dated.

For example, one individual had a criteria entry dated in the year

9992, which resulted in a purge date in the year 9997, or nearly

8,000 years from now. Although these future dates are most likely

the result of data entry errors, an incorrect entry has significant

implications for the timely removal of the individual from CalGang.

When we asked CSRA how such errors could occur, it stated that

before 2009, and then again between 2011 and 2014, CalGang

user agencies could enter future‑dated criteria. CSRA asserted

that it implemented controls in 2014 designed to prevent users

from future‑dating criteria. In addition, CSRA indicated that it

would report the individuals we identified to the appropriate node

administrators for review and possible deletion. However, as of

June 2016, CSRA stated that 115 individuals with future‑dated

criteria remained in CalGang.

Absent a robust review process, the committee has relied

completely on the CalGang software to remove individuals within

the time frames federal regulations specify. Software deficiencies

have allowed some records to remain in CalGang and accessible to

law enforcement agencies far beyond their purge dates. Retaining

records in CalGang for longer than the federal regulations allow

potentially violates individuals’ rights and pollutes CalGang with

outdated information that may hinder law enforcement agencies’

efforts to suppress gang activity.

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Processes to Ensure They Share

CalGang Information Properly and Limit CalGang Access as CalGang

Policy Requires

To preserve individuals’ privacy rights, numerous requirements

contained in the federal regulations, the state guidelines and

CalGang policy exist around sharing CalGang information. These

requirements are generally rooted in the concept that CalGang

information should be shared only for a law enforcement purpose

and only with requesters that have a “need and right to know.”

We identified 628 individuals whose

records had purge dates beyond

the standard five-year time period,

including 257 whose records were

not scheduled to be purged for

more than 100 years.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Nevertheless, we found that CalGang’s oversight entities and user

agencies have not taken all the steps necessary to ensure CalGang

information is shared only when appropriate. Specifically, the four

local law enforcement agencies we reviewed each lack necessary

policies and procedures for sharing CalGang information. Further,

responses to our statewide survey suggest that at least three law

enforcement agencies may have inappropriately used CalGang as an

employment screening tool.

The information‑sharing policies of all four user agencies we

reviewed omit some of the safeguards that CalGang policy requires.

Requests for CalGang information can come either from within

user agencies or from external parties, such as law enforcement

agencies that do not use CalGang, media outlets, and researchers.

CalGang policy requires that each user agency establish written

policies and procedures for accessing CalGang information

that ensure that they only share information in accordance with

existing laws, regulations, and guidelines. However, we identified

weaknesses in the policies of each of the four law enforcement

agencies we reviewed. For example, Los Angeles’s policy addresses

releasing information for discovery motions and requests for

records, and it also specifies the parties that must approve

information releases. Nonetheless, it is silent about documenting

the requestors’ need and right to know and tracking to whom it

releases criminal intelligence—both of which are requirements

in federal regulations and state guidelines. As a result of similar

types of omissions at all four user agencies, the users at the

agencies lack the guidance necessary to ensure they share criminal

intelligence only with authorized recipients and only for law

enforcement purposes.

We attempted to assess Justice’s and the four user agencies’ past

decisions to share information, but we have little assurance

that they identified all of the CalGang requests they received.

Specifically, Justice and the four agencies could identify requests

for CalGang information made pursuant to the Public Records

Act, but none of these law enforcement agencies had processes to

capture internal requests or requests from other law enforcement

agencies. Justice, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and Santa Ana identified

a combined total of 16 information requests they received between

January 2011 and early March 2016; in contrast, the sergeant who

functions as the Sonoma node administrator asserted that Sonoma

did not receive any requests for information during that time frame.

Table 10 shows the information requests categorized by requestor

type and by the nature of the CalGang information requested. We

found that requestors sought criminal intelligence information

in four instances and that the agencies declined to provide the

information because the requestors did not have a right to know it.

The four local law enforcement

agencies we reviewed each lack

necessary policies and procedures

for sharing CalGang information.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Table 10

Summary of CalGang Information Requests Received Between

January 2011 and March 2016 by Requestor Type and the Nature of the

Information Requested

NATURE OF INFORMATION REQUEST

REQUESTOR

CRIMINAL

INTELLIGENCE RECORDS

CALGANG STATISTICS

POLICY AND PROCEDURES/

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

Media

Researchers

Legal counsel

Private party

Totals

Source:

California State Auditor’s analysis of public records requests received by the California

Department of Justice, Santa Ana Police Department, Santa Clara County Sheriff ’s Office, and

Los Angeles Police Department.

Note:

The Table reflects the nature of all the information the requests specified. Requests may have

covered more than one category of information; thus, the nature of the requests will not correlate

with the 16 total requests the four agencies asserted they received.

Conversely, our statewide survey revealed that, of the 190 law

enforcement agencies that responded to this question, three may

have inappropriately shared information because they used

CalGang to screen for employment or military recruitment

purposes. Screenings of these types are not apparent law

enforcement activities—they are not related to preventing or

solving crimes—and thus do not meet the standard of need

or right to know for a law enforcement purpose. Specifically, an

administrative aide from Ventura County Sheriff ’s Department

(Ventura) asserted that she reviewed CalGang to determine if

individuals who applied for employment with Ventura were listed

as gang members. Similarly, a sergeant from Thousand Oaks Police

Department (Thousand Oaks) asserted that the agency reviewed

CalGang to assist the military in determining whether a candidate

was a gang member. Finally, a detective from Santa Barbara County

Sheriff ’s Office (Santa Barbara) reported using CalGang to screen

for employment and to assist the military.

Although each of the three agency officials asserted that they

did not print or distribute any hard‑copy CalGang information

resulting from their searches, using the system in this manner

does not appear appropriate. On three separate occasions dating

back to 2006, the board or the committee determined that user

agencies should not use CalGang for employment background

checks or in response to requests from the military. The board

established that military recruiters do not have the need or right

to know CalGang information and therefore users should not fill

those information requests. Nevertheless, based on our review

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

of their respective minutes, neither the board nor the committee

disseminated these decisions to the CalGang users. Moreover,

the committee did not clarify in CalGang policy that these uses

are prohibited. Consequently, two of the three agencies asserted

that using CalGang to screen employment or military candidates

was appropriate. For example, according to a Thousand Oaks

sergeant, using CalGang to respond to requests from military

recruiters is appropriate because the military does not want to

train gang members in the use of weapons and tactics, thus making

those individuals more dangerous to the public. Alternatively,

the Santa Barbara detective agreed that using CalGang to

screen candidates for internal positions or for the military was

inappropriate and planned to suggest the agency change its

practices. The mix of interpretations is concerning to us and

suggests that user agencies need better, and perhaps more frequent,

training, as we describe in the next section.

The Committee and Node Administrators Cannot Demonstrate They

Follow CalGang Training Policy or Best Practices

As previously discussed, the board and the committee delegate

important tasks to user agencies, such as determining whether

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists to warrant entering

individuals into CalGang. However, the agencies’

abilities to effectively perform these tasks

depends in large part on the training their staff

receives. Consequently, CalGang policy states

that the committee will develop, review, and

approve standardized trainings for the staff at

user agencies. Although the text box shows the

committee’s required training topics for user

agencies, neither the committee nor the two node

administrator agencies we reviewed could

demonstrate that the committee had developed

or approved standardized training materials for

statewide use. Instead, each node administrator

agency develops its own materials. In addition, we

expected to find that the committee had processes

in place to identify needed changes and updates to

the content of the training materials. For example,

changes to state law that took effect in 2014

regarding notifying juveniles and their parents or

guardians before entering juveniles into CalGang

presented the committee with an opportunity to

update CalGang training materials, but we found

no evidence that the committee had done so.

Training Topics for CalGang User Agencies

The CalGang Node Advisory Committee requires that

training for user agencies must address the following topics,

at a minimum:

• The definition of a

criminal street gang

• The accepted criteria for identifying gang members,

affiliates, and adding photos.

• The definition of

criminal predicate

and

reasonable suspicion

• Local, state, and federal statutes and policies regarding

criminal intelligence information.

• Physical and technical security.

• Data dissemination protocols.

• Practical, hands‑on database use.

Source:

California Gang Node Advisory Committee Policy and

Procedures for the CalGang System (2007).

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

The lack of standardized training may have created inconsistencies

in how user agencies apply the criminal intelligence requirements

the committee has adopted. Specifically, as discussed previously,

we found that law enforcement agencies we reviewed did not have

adequate support for including 13 individuals within CalGang.

Moreover, three agencies responded to our survey that they used

CalGang to screen for potential employment, even though this use

does not appear to meet the standard of need and right to know for

a law enforcement purpose. The appropriate adding to and sharing

of information in CalGang is critical to protecting individuals’ right

to privacy, yet the committee has failed to fulfill its responsibility to

ensure user agencies are effectively trained in those two functions.

We also found deficiencies with the committee’s approval of

training content for instructors. CalGang policy requires potential

instructors to attend a committee‑approved, train‑the‑trainer course

and requires node administrators to verify potential instructors’

experience using CalGang. However, neither the committee nor

Sonoma and Los Angeles—which are both node administrator

agencies—could demonstrate that the committee had approved

an instructor training course. In fact, the committee chair—who is

also the Los Angeles node administrator—stated that a formalized

train‑the‑trainer course does not exist. CalGang policy further

states that instructors must complete the 24‑hour user course in

addition to a train‑the‑trainer course. However, CalGang instructors

cannot obtain the requisite number of training hours because the

user training the nodes provide is just 16 hours in length, not

the required 24.

Finally, the committee has not required users to take periodic

refresher trainings so that their skills remain up to date. The

committee does not require such trainings, regardless of how

long users have maintained CalGang access. In our statewide

survey, 86 (46 percent) of the 186 CalGang user agencies that

responded to this question indicated that their users could benefit

from periodic refresher training. Further, a separate analysis we

performed revealed that half of CalGang’s users have had accounts

allowing their access to CalGang for six years or more. The full

distribution of the length of time users have maintained their

accounts is depicted in Figure 4 on the following page. By requiring

only an initial training for users, the committee risks that users’

knowledge of CalGang policy will fade over time or not keep pace

with changes, thereby jeopardizing the integrity and accuracy of

CalGang’s information.

CalGang instructors cannot obtain

the requisite number of training

hours because the user training the

nodes provide is just 16 hours in

length, not the required 24.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Figure 4

Age of Users’ CalGang Accounts

USER

ACCOUNT

AGE

0–2 years

2.01–4 years

4.01–6 years

6.01 years

Source:

California State Auditor’s analysis of CalGang data obtained from the California Department of

Justice as of November 23, 2015.

Note:

Because CalGang did not capture user account creation dates until 2009, we were unable to

determine the exact age of user accounts older than six years.

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Failed to Appropriately Notify

Necessary Parties Before Entering Juveniles Into CalGang

Because two of the four law enforcement agencies we reviewed did

not send all legally required notices before entering juveniles into

CalGang, many juveniles and their parents or guardians (parents)

were not afforded the right to contest the juveniles’ gang designations.

Further, the two agencies that sent the necessary notifications did not

provide the juveniles and their parents with adequate information to

contest the designations. In fact, responses to our statewide survey of

law enforcement agencies revealed that less than 3 percent of juveniles

or their parents contested these designations, possibly as a result of

their notification letters not containing adequate information. Because

the two law enforcement agencies have not complied with state law

related to these notifications, they have limited the effectiveness of the

juvenile notification process as a means to identify juveniles whom

they may have mistakenly added to CalGang as gang members.

State law effective January 1, 2014, generally requires law enforcement

agencies to send juveniles and their parents notices before adding

juveniles to a shared gang database, such as CalGang. Figure 5 depicts

the juvenile notification process the state law established. This process

requires notifying juveniles and parents or guardians of the basis for

the juveniles’ gang designations and of their right to contest the gang

designations. The process also describes the limited circumstances in

which law enforcement agencies do not have to notify the juveniles

and the parents.

Figure 5

The Required Juvenile Notification and Contestation Process as Applied to CalGang

The agency agrees

with contestation.

Juvenile’s record

remains in CalGang.

Juvenile’s record

deleted from CalGang.

The agency disagrees

with contestation.

A law enforcement officer

determines a juvenile meets

the minimum criteria required

to be designated as a gang

member (designation).*

The law enforcement agency

(agency) sends written notice

of the designation to the

juvenile and his/her parent or

guardian (parent).

A juvenile or parent contests in

writing the juvenile’s designation.

The agency has 60 days to

review the contestation and

respond to the juvenile and parent

with written verification of the

agency’s decision.

The agency does not send a

written notice because the

notice would do one of

the following:

• Compromise an ongoing

criminal investigation.

• Compromise the juvenile’s

health or safety.

DOES AN

EXCEPTION

EXIST?

The agency adds the juvenile

to CalGang and the law

enforcement officer affirms

that the notice was sent or

an exception applied.

†

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of the Penal Code and the CalGang juvenile-notification process.

A juvenile is defined as an individual who is under 18 years of age. A juvenile can be designated as a gang member or gang affiliate.

†

If a law enforcement officer indicates in CalGang that the agency did not send a notification because of an exception, the officer must document a

detailed reason for the exception.

Between January 1, 2014, and November 23, 2015, user agencies added

more than 2,200 juveniles to CalGang. Following January 2014, the

number of juveniles that user agencies added to CalGang dropped

significantly; from 2013 to 2014, the number decreased by 1,134, or

48 percent. In fact, the number of juveniles Sonoma and Santa Clara

each added dropped to zero. Officers at each agency asserted that they

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

stopped adding juveniles to CalGang in direct response to the new

notification requirements. Specifically, the Sonoma gang enforcement

sergeant asserted that Sonoma stopped adding juveniles for reasons

that included the administrative burden and his perception that parents

frequently refuse to believe their children are associated with a gang and

would attack the agency’s motives. On the other hand, Santa Clara’s gang

sergeant asserted that his agency no longer adds juveniles to CalGang

because it does not have a notification process in place and wants to

learn from the processes other agencies have established. However, when

user agencies choose not to add juveniles to CalGang to avoid notifying

juveniles and their parents or to wait and learn from other agencies’

processes, CalGang becomes a less useful tool for protecting the public

from gang violence.

As indicated in Table 11, the two user agencies we reviewed—which were

limited to Los Angeles and Santa Ana for the reasons just described—

were unable to demonstrate that they properly sent letters before adding

juveniles to CalGang for all but 35 of the 129 records we reviewed.

Specifically, we found that Santa Ana did not send letters to juveniles,

but rather only to their parents. Based on interviews with a number

of officials, we determined that Santa Ana misinterpreted the law’s

requirements. In contrast, Los Angeles has a policy that describes a

process that meets the law’s notification requirement, but we found that

officers in the five divisions we reviewed—Los Angeles has 21 divisions

in total—did not follow the policy. Consequently, Los Angeles could

not demonstrate that it sent letters to 29 juveniles and their parents.

Moreover, Los Angeles sent notices for 50 juveniles after entering them

into CalGang instead of before, as required; in fact, in several instances,

it did not send the letters for more than a month after entering the

juveniles into CalGang. As reasons for not following state law, officials

for Los Angeles cited turnover in officer and administrative staff

positions as well as agency staff misunderstanding the requirements.

Table 11

Rates of Adherence to State Law Requiring Juvenile Gang Designation From January 2014 Through November 2015

TOTAL NUMBER OF

JUVENILES’ RECORDS

REVIEWED

RECORDS FOR WHICH

NOTIFICATION

REQUIREMENTS WERE MET

RECORDS FOR WHICH

NOTIFICATION LETTERS

WERE NOT SENT [JUVENILE

AND/OR THEIR PARENTS*]

RECORDS FOR WHICH

NOTIFICATION LETTERS

WERE SENT AFTER

CALGANG ENTRY [JUVENILE

OR THE PARENTS]

Santa Ana Police Department

Los Angeles Police Department

114

Totals

129

Percent of total juveniles’ records reviewed

————————

27%

34%

39%

73%

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of juvenile notification letters and other documents for the law enforcement agencies listed.

Because state law requires law enforcement agencies to send notification letters to the juvenile and their parents or guardians (parents), this column

represents instances in which law enforcement agencies did not send letters to either party and both parties.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

We also determined that Los Angeles’s and

Santa Ana’s notices were inadequate because they

did not provide the bases the agencies used for the

juveniles’ gang designations. Although state law

requires law enforcement agencies to provide the

bases for gang designations, the law does not specify

what information the agencies need to include to

fulfill that requirement. A bill analysis on the

juvenile notification law states that the basis for a

gang designation would be source documents, such

as arrest reports and field interview cards, indicating

that the person met the criteria for being considered

a gang member. However, the notification letters

Los Angeles and Santa Ana sent offered only

conclusory language that was so vague it did not

fully inform the juveniles and parents of the contacts

or analyses that led to the designations. The text box

cites the relevant language the agencies included in

their letters to parents. Although the Los Angeles

letters invite juveniles and parents to contact an

officer with their questions, neither letter cites the

specific criteria the agency used for identifying

juveniles as members of gangs.

Without knowing law enforcement agencies’ bases

for suspecting gang membership, juveniles and

their parents do not have sufficient information

to meaningfully challenge those agencies’ decisions to add the

juveniles to CalGang. Part of the Legislature’s intent in developing

the notification process was to ensure that user agencies did not

incorrectly enter juveniles into CalGang. However, parents and

juveniles cannot contest juvenile gang designations effectively, if

at all, without knowing the criteria user agencies determined the

juveniles met. Because of the lack of information in the juvenile

notification letters, parents sometimes submitted letters that simply

stated that their children were not gang members. Other parents

submitted character references from school principals and church

leaders or descriptions of their own efforts to keep their children

away from gangs. These types of responses—which are the result

of the lack of information the user agencies provided—do not

help the agencies identify mistakes they may have made when

concluding that juveniles met the criteria for entry into CalGang.

Thus, the insufficient notification letters have disadvantaged the

law enforcement agencies, juveniles, and parents.

We found that few juveniles and parents contested gang designations

and that—contrary to state law—the two user agencies generally

responded only to the party that contested the designation which

only partially fulfilled the law. Table 12 on the following page

Excerpts From Juvenile Notification Letters Law

Enforcement Agencies Sent to Parents

Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles)

On __[date]__, your son/daughter, __[name]_, was involved

in a field contact by officers from the Los Angeles Police

Department. As a result, information relative to __[name]___

participation in or association with an active street gang was

discovered. The contact met the minimum criteria required

by state law to identify him/her as an active gang member

or active affiliate gang member. Therefore, his/her name

and gang affiliation will be entered into the department’s

computerized shared gang database.

Santa Ana Police Department (Santa Ana)

On __[date]__, your son/daughter, __[name]__, was

contacted by Officers from the Santa Ana Police Department.

As a result of a law enforcement officer’s investigation, your

child’s participation in or association with an active criminal

street gang has been included in our files based upon two or

more of the following criteria, including but not limited to:

arrest and/or associating with criminal street gang members,

frequenting gang area, gang indicia, statements made by a

contacted individual.

Sources:

Los Angeles’s and Santa Ana’s juvenile notification

letter templates.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

summarizes the number and rate of contested juvenile gang

designations for Los Angeles and Santa Ana, as well as the results

from our survey of 329 law enforcement agencies. Santa Ana’s higher

rate of contestations may be the result of its notification process.

Specifically, it sends notices to parents each time a contact with a

law enforcement officer results in an update to a juvenile’s CalGang

record. This process, which results in multiple letters to parents,

exceeds the requirements of state law. Although the law requires

that agencies inform both juveniles and parents of their decisions

in response to contestations, we found that the two user agencies

generally responded only to the party that contested the designation.

Table 12

Contestations of Juvenile Gang Designations at Two Law Enforcement

Agencies and Statewide From January 1, 2014, Through October 31, 2015

LOS ANGELES POLICE

DEPARTMENT

(LOS ANGELES)

SANTA ANA POLICE

DEPARTMENT

(SANTA ANA)

STATEWIDE

SURVEY

RESULTS*

Number of juveniles

381

140

1,705

Number of contestations received

†

Contestation rate

14%

†

Number of juveniles removed from

CalGang in response to a contestation

Sources:

California State Auditor’s analysis of Los Angeles’s and Santa Ana’s juvenile notification

records and other documents, and unaudited statewide survey results.

These numbers represent self-reported data from our statewide survey.

†

Santa Ana’s process requires it to send a letter to a juvenile’s parents for each law enforcement

contact the juvenile has that results in it creating or updating a CalGang record. Sending multiple

letters to parents likely contributed to the higher contestation rate in Santa Ana.

Although the law provides two reasons to justify law enforcement

agencies’ decisions not to notify juveniles and their parents before

adding the juveniles into CalGang, we found that the user agencies

rarely use these options. Specifically, as Figure 5 on page 47 illustrates,

law enforcement agencies can choose not to notify juveniles and

their parents if they believe doing so will compromise either ongoing

criminal investigations or the juveniles’ health or safety. However,

based on our reviews of Santa Ana and Los Angeles, as well as

the responses from our statewide survey, we determined that law

enforcement agencies rarely choose not to send notices for these

two reasons. In fact, Santa Ana has not used either option since the

law went into effect in 2014, and Los Angeles documented using

these options for just five juveniles. Further, the responses from

our survey suggest that user agencies statewide documented only

10 additional instances in which the agencies justified not sending

notices for the exceptions provided in law.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

In response to our concerns about their juvenile notification

practices, officials with Los Angeles and Santa Ana asserted

they would take corrective actions. A detective who serves as

the Los Angeles node administrator is working to implement a

juvenile notification review process in which staff will review

all juveniles Los Angeles officers entered since January 1, 2014 and

document whether officers fulfilled the requirements of state law.

If juveniles do not meet the law’s requirements, the detective’s plan

is to delete the juvenile, send proper notification, and reenter the

juvenile into CalGang. The detective is also planning to implement

a process in which he will review some juveniles each month to

ensure adherence to the law’s requirements.

Similarly, a commander from Santa Ana provided updated letter

templates for both juveniles and their parents. However, the letters’

text still does not provide the bases for the juvenile’s designation as

a gang member. According to the commander, Santa Ana chose not

to include more specific information because it believes the letter

gives parents and juveniles a sense of the behavior that led to the

juveniles’ contacts with the law enforcement officers. He also stated

that providing specifics about contacts would focus arguments on

the contacts or incentivize juveniles to stop certain behaviors purely

to prevent police detection, which are outcomes he does not believe

would be productive. He stated that the benefit of the juvenile

notification law is the conversations it can initiate among parents,

juveniles, and law enforcement officers related to the resources

the agency may provide to keep the juveniles away from and out

of gangs. However, we believe that for these conversations to be

productive, parents need specific information about the nature of

their children’s contacts with law enforcement officers.

Notwithstanding Los Angeles’s and Santa Ana’s failures to properly

implement state law, we recognize that both agencies have

demonstrated a commitment to the juveniles they suspect

are gang members. Los Angeles has contacted parents about

juveniles’ gang designations through letters, calls, or in‑person

meetings since at least 1998. Moreover, the letters Los Angeles

currently sends to parents and juveniles invite them to contact

officers about questions and to learn about community programs.

Similarly, since about 1989 Santa Ana has notified juveniles that

their involvement with gangs could subject them to criminal

prosecution. Although this notice does not reference CalGang, it

makes very clear that the agency has determined the juveniles are

a part of or associated with specific gangs; in fact, the agency uses

documentation from these notices to add individuals to CalGang.

After the implementation of the juvenile notification law in 2014,

Santa Ana exceeded the law’s requirements by notifying parents after

each contact juveniles had with police that resulted in updates to

their records.

In response to our concerns about

their juvenile notification practices,

officials with Los Angeles and

Santa Ana asserted they would take

corrective actions.

CalGang instructors cannot obtain

the requisite number of training

hours because the user training the

nodes provide is just 16 hours in

length, not the required 24.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Moreover, Santa Ana’s process when it receives a contestation

letter represents a best practice that we believe could be the

basis for statewide standards. Specifically, at Santa Ana a police

investigator assembles background information on the juvenile’s

case, and a corporal calls the family to discuss the juvenile’s entry

into CalGang. Following the review and conversation, the corporal

decides whether the juvenile should remain in CalGang. Santa Ana’s

approach has resulted in it removing from CalGang more than a

third of the juveniles who were the subject of contestations by the

juveniles or their parents. This approach establishes relationships

that can lead to a better understanding of juveniles’ situations for

both the officers and the families, and it also achieves greater data

accuracy for the law enforcement agencies using CalGang.

Governmental Oversight and Increased Public Participation Could

Strengthen CalGang’s Usefulness and Better Ensure It Protects

Individuals’ Rights

State and local law enforcement officials assert that CalGang is an

important tool because it helps them to quickly identify information

necessary to solve or prosecute gang crimes. User agencies’ success

stories chronicle how they used CalGang to identify homicide

victims and suspects through physical descriptions, like their

tattoos, and to link local crimes to suspects or to crimes in other

communities. For example, an officer in Salinas posted a testimonial

in CalGang noting that he used CalGang to identify a murder

suspect using a name, physical description, and believed gang

affiliation. Witnesses then verified the suspect in a photo lineup,

leading to his arrest for murder. Upon conviction, the courts

sentenced the man with gang enhancements—years added to a

prison term when an individual commits a crime to promote or

assist a gang. The officer praised CalGang and encouraged other

CalGang users to provide as much information as possible in

their CalGang entries because even a minor gang contact could

help solve a murder.

However, because of its potential to enhance public safety, CalGang

needs an oversight structure that better ensures that the data entered

into it are reliable and that its users adhere to the requirements that

protect individuals’ rights. To this end, we believe the Legislature

should adopt state law that specifies that CalGang, or any equivalent

statewide shared gang database, must operate under defined

requirements.

We believe these requirements should encompass the

federal regulations and key safeguards from the state guidelines,

including supervisory and periodic record reviews. Further, we

believe state law should assign Justice the responsibility for overseeing

CalGang and for ensuring user agencies meet all the relevant

requirements. Establishing Justice as a centralized oversight entity

We believe state law should be

adopted that assigns Justice the

responsibility for overseeing

CalGang and for ensuring

user agencies meet all the

relevant requirements.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

responsible for establishing best practices and holding user agencies

accountable for implementing these practices will help ensure

CalGang’s accuracy and safeguard individuals’ privacy protections.

Moreover, we believe state law should create a technical advisory

committee to provide Justice information about CalGang’s use and

user agencies’ needs. Figure 6 on the following page illustrates what, in

our view, would be a stronger oversight structure for CalGang.

The Legislature also has an opportunity to set standards for

transparency and public participation where none currently

exist. Generally, CalGang’s current operations are outside of

public view. As previously discussed, we found that the CalGang

users self‑administer the committee’s audits and that they do not

meaningfully report the results to the board, the committee, or the

public. Further, CalGang’s governance does not meet in public, and

neither the board nor the committee invites public participation by

posting meeting dates, agendas, or reports about CalGang.

Increased transparency in CalGang’s governance and operations

could strengthen the public’s confidence in the system. For example,

although the proposed technical advisory committee would likely

need to close parts of its meetings to protect criminal intelligence

information, we believe other parts of its meetings should be open

and should comply with open‑meeting requirements. Further,

requiring Justice either to conduct or to hire an external entity to

conduct periodic audits would shed light on aspects of CalGang’s

privacy safeguards that do not operate effectively and should help

lead to necessary corrective actions. In addition, we recommend

that the Legislature require Justice to develop annual reports that

include CalGang statistics and summary‑level audit results. Justice

should make these reports available for public comment and, in

subsequent annual reports, summarize public concerns and the

actions Justice has taken to address them.

Finally, establishing CalGang as a public program would create

opportunities for public participation through the legislative and

regulatory processes. As the Legislature drafts the bill that will

provide for CalGang’s new oversight structure and framework,

law enforcement officials and the public will have opportunities to

express their concerns and needs. Using the regulatory process

to establish requirements for user agencies will provide the public

and law enforcement agencies an opportunity to comment on and

help guide how the requirements are developed.

Increased transparency in CalGang’s

governance and operations could

strengthen the public’s confidence

in the system.

California State Auditor Report 2015-130

August 2016

Figure 6

A Model for More Transparent and Accountable Oversight for a Shared Gang Database

THE LEGISLATURE

Key Legislative Actions

Establish requirements for CalGang, or any equivalent statewide

shared gang database, in state law as detailed below.

Require the database to comply with federal regulations and

important safeguards from the state guidelines.*

Public process

Non-public process

Oversee

Collaborate

Key Requirements to be Specified in Law

JUSTICE

Engage in a regulatory process to define important

requirements like gang member criteria.

Conduct or hire an external entity to conduct

periodic audits.

Standardize training and ensure it is periodically

provided to all end users.

Publish an annual report with key statistics and

summary audit results. Invite, assess, and act on

public comments.

USERS

Implement supervisory review procedures.

Implement periodic record reviews and

report the results to Justice.

Key Requirements to be Specified in Law

TECHNICAL

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Advise Justice of best practices, database use,

and database needs.

Periodically review policies and procedures to

provide suggestions to Justice for their

improvement.

Obtain public input when appropriate.

Key Requirements to be Specified in Law

Make the California Department of

Justice (Justice) responsible for the database

Create a technical

advisory committee

LAW

Voluntarily

participate

Source:

Based on the California State Auditor’s recommendations to the Legislature.

State guidelines refers to Justice’s

Model Standards and Procedures for Maintaining Cri

Wednesday, August 17, 2016

The CalGang Criminal Intelligence System

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